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Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option
ChristopherSlobogin & Mark R Fondacaro*
ABSTRACT: The current eclectic mix of solutions to the juvenile-crime
problem is insufficiently conceptualized and too beholden to myths about
youth, the crimes they commit, and effective means of responding to their
problems. The dominant punitive approach to juvenile justice, modeled on
the adult criminal justice system, either ignores or misapplies current
knowledge about the causes ofjuvenile crime and the means of reducing it.
But the rehabilitativevision that motivated the progenitors of the juvenile
court errs in the other direction, by allowing the state to assert its police
power even over those who are innocent of crime. The most popular
compromise theory of juvenile justice-which claims that developmental
differences between adolescents and adults make the former less
blamewaorthy-is also misguided because it tends to de-emphasize crimereducing interventions, overstate the degree to which adolescent
responsibility is diminished, and play into the hands of those who would
abolish the juvenile justice system, since it relies on the same metricculpability-as the adult criminaljustice system. This Article argues that,
with some significant adjustments that take new knowledge about the
psychological, social, and biologicalfeatures of adolescence into account, the
legal system should continue to maintain a separatejuvenile court, but one
that is single-mindedlyfocused on the prevention of criminal behavior rather
than retributivepunishment.
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JUVENILEJUSTICE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The usual story told about the juvenile justice system is that it must
follow one of three paths. The "rehabilitation" path, which probably comes
closest to the original motivation for establishing a separate court for
juveniles, treats troubled youths as innocent and salvageable beings who
must be kept away from adult criminals to enhance their chances of
becoming productive citizens.1 Under the rehabilitative view, the triggering
act need not be criminal, disposition is designed to make the child a better
person, and confinement meant as punishment is to be avoided. The second
path-"adult retribution"-heads in the opposite direction. In vogue among
many state legislatures in recent years, the adult-retribution approach posits
that most young people who commit crime are fully accountable individuals
who should be punished in the same fashion as adults. 2 This path leads to
broad transfer-to-adult-court jurisdiction, adult-like sentences in juvenile
court, or both. The third option, which probably represents the consensus
academic view as well as the practice in a number of jurisdictions, sits
somewhere in between the rehabilitative and adult-retribution approaches.
It treats juveniles as neither innocent nor fully culpable, but rather posits
that their responsibility is diminished because of their youth.3 Under this
"diminished-retribution" model, dispositions are discounted proportionate
to the degree of immaturity, either on an individual basis or categorically.
This Article describes a fourth option for juvenile justice-what we call
"individual prevention." Framed in terms of the traditional purposes of
punishment, the focus of the individual-prevention model is specific
deterrence through treatment and, if necessary, incapacitation. Because of
its focus on treatment, this path is closely related to the rehabilitation vision.
Unlike the rehabilitative model, however, the individual-prevention
approach avoids claiming that juveniles are legally innocent or excused
because of their youth, retains the retributive model's threshold
requirement of a criminal act, and is single-mindedly focused on recidivism
reduction rather than the broader goal of creating a well-socialized
individual. Its primary divergence from the two retributive models is its
rejection of relative culpability as the basis for the duration and type of
disposition. Instead of that metric, the individual-prevention model favors
assessments of risk that vary the intervention depending on the most
effective, least restrictive means of curbing future crime.
This Article argues that the individual-prevention approach to juvenile
justice is preferable to the other three because it fits best with our current

1. See infra text accompanying notes 16-28 (discussing the rehabilitative model).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 29-34 (discussing the adult-retribution model).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 35-38 (discussing the diminished-retribution
model).
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knowledge about the causes and treatment of youthful offending, is the
easiest to justify under current legal doctrine, and provides the most
persuasive explanation for maintaining a separate juvenile justice system.
Consider first what we know aboutjuveniles who commit crime. Recent
research, described in more detail later in this Article, 4 can be summarized
in terms of three important findings relating to the psychology, context, and
treatment ofjuvenile offending. First, while juvenile offenders above the age
of nine or ten normally can form criminal intent and understand the
wrongfulness of their actions in a shallow sense, both pre-teen and teen
offenders are less likely than adults-for a host of psychological and
biological reasons-to consider the consequences of their actions or the
prospect of punishment. Second, while juvenile offending, like adult
offending, is in part the result of "internal" desires and beliefs, it is also
particularly prone to the influence of context-peers, families, and
neighborhoods. Third, following naturally from the second finding, the
most successful way to reduce most juvenile offending is not incapacitation
in a detention facility-a disposition that studies show is likely to increase
recidivism-but rather intervention in the community specifically designed
to ameliorate or eliminate the contextual risk factors (as well as
psychological risk factors) associated with crime.
The first set of findings, on the psychology of juvenile offenders,
indicates that adolescent-and even many pre-adolescent--offenders are
not "innocent" as a legal matter, thus undercutting the key premise of the
rehabilitative model. But it also suggests that youthful offenders are
distinguishable from adult criminals from a psychological perspective, and
thus are not ideal candidates for the adult-retribution approach. These two
conclusions might seem to support the diminished-retribution model. But in
fact they do not, because current criminal-law doctrine requires very serious
impairment before culpability mitigation can occur. For instance, adult
criminal offenders with a mental disability rarely receive reduced sentences,
yet their legally relevant capacities are substantially more diminished than
those of the typical teenager. Moreover, the most significant traits of
adolescent immaturity are not compromised cognitive abilities, but rather
impulsivity and a tendency to give into peer pressure-traits which seldom
5
support a case for mitigation for adults.
In contrast, the research on the psychology of juvenile crime strongly
supports the premises of the individual-prevention model, which neither
assumes juvenile offenders are innocent, nor attributes significance to
gradations in culpability between adults and adolescents. As we explain later

4.

See infra Part III (reviewing research on juvenile offenders and crime-prevention

programs).
5.

See infra text accompanying notes 135-56 (discussing typical mitigation factors for both

adults and juveniles).
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in this Article, 6 for prudential reasons an individual-prevention regime
would require a conviction for a criminal act as a predicate for intervention,
and thus would not treat the juvenile offender as blameless like the
rehabilitation model does. At the same time, unlike the retributive models,
the all-important dispositional decision in a prevention regime is focused on
risk. Thus, neither the outcome in individual cases nor the operation of the
system as a whole relies on the proposition that juveniles are fully culpable
(as contemplated by the adult-retribution model) or the equally
questionable proposition that they are substantially less culpable than adults
(the premise of the diminished-retribution model).
A similar analysis applies to the second set of empirical findings, to the
effect that contextual factors heavily influence juvenile offenders. While
perhaps useful as an explanatory matter and thus sympathy-inducing, these
types of research conclusions usually would not be given legally mitigating
effect in the adult criminal justice setting. 7 Thus, once again science is
ignored by the adult-retribution model, which considers the debilitating
effects of context irrelevant, and provides only tenuous support for the
diminished-retribution model, which requires that those effects be seriously
compromising. In contrast, the findings regarding the ecological etiology of
juvenile offending are of much more relevance in rehabilitation and
individual-prevention regimes, and particularly so in the latter type of
system, where they can be extremely helpful in devising instruments for
assessing risk and in designing post-conviction programs that reduce the
antisocial effects of immaturity and environment.
The third major research finding-that juvenile crime is most
effectively reduced through community interventions specifically aimed at
antisocial conduct-also fits more comfortably with an individual-prevention
approach than with the other three approaches. Because the goal under the
individual-prevention approach is public safety, these community-based
programs should be the disposition of choice. This conclusion is not as
clearly warranted, however, in a purely rehabilitative regime, which might
accommodate any program, including segregation, that can help the
juvenile "improve."8 Endorsement of a community-based dispositional
regime is even more difficult under the adult- and diminished-retribution
models. Adult punishment is usually associated with some type of
imprisonment. Even punishment that has been discounted due to juvenile
immaturity is hard to square with community programs, at least when the
crime committed is a felony. Thus, the research suggests that an honestly

6. See infra text accompanying notes 195-200 (explaining that the individual-prevention
model requires a criminal act).
7.

See infra text accompanying notes 150-51 (noting that in the adult criminal justice

setting, contextual factors are rarely given mitigating weight).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 26-27 (describing the use of "reformatories" and
other programs that are vestiges of the rehabilitative approach).
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applied retributive regime-adult or diminished-cannot take full
advantage of advances in reducing juvenile recidivism and, indeed, is likely
to lead to higher levels of recidivism, given the finding that incarceration
tends to exacerbate the reoffending rate.
The individual-prevention model is also the easiest to justify as a
jurisprudential matter. The foregoing discussion should make clear why the
legal justifications for the other three options are weak. The myth that
adolescent offenders are legally innocent of crime cannot sustain the
rehabilitative model. The only alternative rationale for that model-that
youth are more amenable to treatment and therefore can be coercively
rehabilitated any time they need treatment-probably runs afoul of
constitutional restrictions on the state's parens patriae power. 9 The adultretribution model is also on shaky ground, because it fails to take into
account the immaturity of most adolescents. Finally, the diminishedresponsibility model ascribes too much mitigating effect to juvenile
immaturity. Fifteen-, sixteen-, and seventeen-year-olds, the age groups that
commit most juvenile crime, are much closer to adults than pre-adolescents
on the traditional measures of criminal desert. 10
Compared to these rationales, the justification for the individualprevention model-reduction of criminal recidivism-is more compelling.
Because it is aimed at preventing crime, it more obviously benefits both
youthful offenders and the public than punishment meted out as a matter of
desert. But it does so without endorsing the blunderbuss therapeutic
approach associated with the rehabilitative model.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has endorsed the individual-prevention
rationale as a constitutional matter. In the 1997 decision of Kansas v.
Hendricks,1' the Court upheld, against a substantive due process challenge,
sexual-predator statutes that permit post-sentence commitment, so long as
they require proof that the offender is "dangerous beyond [his or her]
control." 12 In other words, the Court held that individuals whose lack of
volitional control makes them relatively undeterrable may be preventively
detained if necessary to avoid recidivism. By analogy, one can argue that the
same indicia of immaturity in juveniles that reduce culpability-impulsivity,
attraction to risk, and peer-driven behavior-also decrease deterrability or
responsiveness to social norms, and thus would permit preventive
intervention, ideally designed to increase deterrability.

9. See infra text accompanying notes 124-29 (discussing the constitutional restraints on
the state's parenspatriaepower).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 51-53 (describing behavioral-science research on
the development ofjuveniles' cognitive capacities).
11.

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), discussed infra text accompanying notes

163-74.
12. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
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Admittedly, a purely preventive system, or even one that, as proposed
here, requires a predicate criminal act, is anathema to many because of its
association with indeterminate detention and a dehumanizing therapeutic
state. For instance, sexual-predator statutes can and have authorized
indeterminate, life-long commitment for autonomous offenders who would
ordinarily be subject to determinate punishment. 13 However, the potential
abuses associated with an individual-prevention regime are mitigated
substantially when applied to juvenile offenders. Given the durational
limitation on juvenile-court jurisdiction, long-term indeterminate
confinement would be rare. Nor would preventive intervention in the
juvenile setting represent the insult to autonomy that a similar system in the
adult context would, given the actual and perceived relative immaturity of
juveniles.
In short, this Article argues that whatever its viability might be in the
adult setting, the individual-prevention model is a good jurisprudential fit
with the juvenile justice system. The debate over whether a retributive
approach to adult criminal justice is preferable to one that focuses on
utilitarian goals of incapacitation, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation has
a long pedigree and is in somewhat of a stalemate today. 14 But in the special
context of juvenile justice, the scale tips decidedly in favor of the latter
agenda.
The final advantage of the individual-prevention model is that it is more
likely to ensure the political future of a truly separate juvenile justice system,
a goal that most observers of the system share. None of the other models
explain as effectively why juvenile offenders should be handled differently
than adult offenders. The adult-retribution model obviously pushes in the
opposite direction, given its equation of juveniles with adults. While the
rehabilitative model does offer something quite different from the adult
criminal justice system, it blatantly fails to satisfy the public's or legislatures'
appetite for assuring accountability for crimes or their desire for protection
against dangerous individuals.
The diminished-retribution model appears to be a plausible
compromise between the two. But, like the adult-retribution model, it too
ultimately fails to draw a sufficient distinction between adolescent and adult
offenders. Even if, contrary to the assertion of this Article, adolescents are
less culpable than adults in a legally significant way, the most efficient
method of recognizing that lesser culpability-and therefore a very tempting
political option in an era of limited budgets and pressure to be tough on
crime-is simply to try juveniles in adult court and reduce their sentence
13.
Eric S. Janus, PreventingSexual Violence: Setting Principled ConstitutionalBoundaries on Sex
Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 206 (1996) ("Not one person committed since 1975 has

been discharged from a final sex offender commitment in Minnesota.").
14. For a summary of this debate, see generally Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7
BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 17 (2003).
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length proportionately. Under the diminished-responsibility model there is
no need for both a juvenile and an adult system because both use the same
metric: culpability. The diminished-responsibility model is understandably
popular among juvenile advocates because it appears to avoid the harshness
of the adult system, but it is flawed because it fails to distinguish juveniles
sufficiently from adults.
A juvenile justice system focused on individual prevention, in contrast,
is based on an entirely different construct than the criminal justice system. It
is forward-looking rather than backward-looking. Its principal aim is
reducing crime, not punishing it. The public and legislators can honestly be
told that a separate juvenile justice system is necessary because its priorities
are so dissimilar from the adult system. Moreover, surveys suggest that the
public will perceive this message positively; at bottom, the public is more
interested in rehabilitating juveniles than punishing them, so long as the
rehabilitation is focused on reducing crime. 15 In a nutshell, the longevity of
the juvenile justice system is more likely to be assured if its mission is framed
in terms of prevention rather than treatment or punishment.
Part II of this Article provides a more elaborate discussion of the four
options for juvenile justice. Part III summarizes what we have learned about
juvenile crime and the methods for reducing it. Part TV then explains why
this research supports the individual-prevention model of juvenile justice
more strongly than competing models. Part V addresses objections to the
individual-prevention model and reiterates some of its benefits.
II.

THE FOUR PATHS OFJUVENILEJUSTICE

The history of the juvenile court provides exemplars of all four models
of juvenile justice. The rehabilitative vision strongly informed the very first
juvenile court, begun in the late nineteenth century in Chicago. Jane
Addams, who helped establish the court, described its operation as follows:
The child was brought before the judge with no one to prosecute
him and with no one to defend him-the judge and all concerned
were merely trying to find out what could be done on his behalf.
The element of conflict was absolutely eliminated and with it, all
notion of punishment ....

16

Ben Lindsey, an early juvenile-court judge who wholeheartedly subscribed to
this vision, opined that "our laws against crime were as inapplicable to
children as they would be to idiots." 17 In the eyes of these progenitors,
juvenile offenders were blameless, and the goal of the juvenile court was not
to punish, but to help. As one commentator put it, the original juvenile15. See infra text accompanying notes 182-83, 208 (discussing the public's preference for
reducingjuvenile crime through the least-restrictive punishment).
16. JANEADDAMS, MYFRIENDJULIALATHROP 96 (Univ. of lll. Press 2004) (1935).
17.

BEN LINDsEY & HARVEYJ. O'HIGGINS, THE BEAsT 133 (1910).
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court movement "assumed that young people under an articulated statutory
age (sometimes as high as 21 years of age) are incapable of rational
decisionmaking and thus lack the capacity for moral accountability assumed
by the punitive model."18
Under a pure rehabilitative model, then, the state is implementing its
parenspatriaepower, not its police power. 19 Although no court-not even the
one Addams championed-consistently endorsed the youth-as-innocents
concept, 20 the rehabilitative model that court spawned still heavily
influences discussions ofjuvenile justice. The vision has both substantive and
procedural implications, vestiges of which are visible today. The procedural
implications have been discussed elsewhere. 2 1 Here the focus is on the
"subject matter jurisdiction" of the juvenile court.
The principal substantive implication of the rehabilitative model is that
the grounds for intervention are quite wide-ranging. For instance, Judge

Lindsey thought the court should ask, "Is the child ... given to playing
'hookey' from school, or 'bumming' and running away, showing an entire
22
lack of ambition or desire to work and settle down to regular habits?"
Julian Mack, another early juvenile-court judge, asked, "Why is it not the
duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy or girl has
committed a special offense, to find out what he is, physically, mentally,
morally ... ?"23 From these types of sentiments rose an expansion of
juvenile-court jurisdiction beyond the law of (adult) crimes to include socalled "status offenses," such as truancy, disobedience, and incorrigibility.
For example, one statute defined as "delinquent" any youth who
knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons; or,
who, without just cause and without the consent of its parents or
custodian, absents itself from its home or place of abode, or who is
growing up in idleness or crime; ... or who patronizes or visits any
public pool room or bucket shop; or wanders about the streets in
the night time without being on any lawful business or occupation;
or who habitually wanders about any railroad yards or tracks or
jumps or attempts to jump onto any moving train; ...

or who

Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to Be Punished: Some Implications of
18.
TreatingKids as Persons,68 NEB. L. REV. 182, 191 (1989).
David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING
19.

BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 13, 18 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000)
[hereinafter CHANGING BORDERS].

20. See id. at 18-19 ("[T]he idealized juvenile court that Addams and other leaders in the
juvenile court movement spoke about so glowingly never actually existed.").
21. See generally Mark Fondacaro, Christopher Slobogin & Tricia Cross, Reconceptualizing
Due Process in Juvenile Justice. Contributionsfrom Law and Social Science, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955

(2006) (proposing a procedural framework for the juvenile justice system).
22.

ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 142 n.15 (2d

ed. 1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23.

Julian W. Mack, TheJuvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
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habitually uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language;
or who is guilty of immoral conduct in any public place or about
24
any school house.
Reminiscent of vagrancy statutes the Supreme Court eventually
declared unconstitutional,25 these types of laws gave juvenile-court judges
discretion to intervene in the lives of vast numbers of youth. And those
interventions were sometimes quite intrusive. For instance, the "childsavers," as they have been called, believed that young offenders needed to be
removed from their environment and detained in "reformatories." These
institutions were meant to be "guarded sanctuaries, combining love and
guidance with firmness and restraint," and were aimed at protecting their
inmates from "idleness, indulgence, and luxuries through military drill,
physical exercise, and constant supervision. '' 26 One still sees vestiges of the
rehabilitative approach in residential programs that focus on "milieu
treatment" (involving residents in day-to-day interaction through
psychotherapeutic discussion) and "behavioral token programs" (where
youths are rewarded for conforming to rules), as well as in counseling
programs that combine individual psychotherapy with close supervision. 27
Thus, the outline of the rehabilitative model is clear. Juveniles are to be
excused and treated, not punished, for their antisocial behavior. That
behavior does not need to amount to crime, because the primary goal is not
to prevent future criminal behavior but to improve the psychological wellbeing and socialization of the child. As one commentator described it, the
progenitors of the juvenile court viewed it as "a legal bridge between the
28
troubled child and the agencies of amelioration."
Most of the history of the juvenile court in the past half-century has
consisted of backing away from the substantive implications of the
rehabilitation vision. Much of the movement has been along the adultretribution path. Even in the early days of the juvenile court, judges found
ways to transfer to adult court those juveniles who committed serious crimes
or appeared to be particularly dangerous. 29 The steadiest progression
toward a harsher juvenile court, however, has been during the past thirty

24. Tanenhaus, supra note 19, at 40 n.17; see also Mack, supra note 23, at 107 (arguing that
the State, instead of punishing children, should attempt to rehabilitate them).
25. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (declaring unconstitutionally
vague a California statute requiring vagrants to provide a peace officer with a "credible and
reliable" identification); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972)
(declaring unconstitutionally vague aJacksonville, Florida vagrancy ordinance).
26. PLATT, supra note 22, at 54.
27. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 118 (2001) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT].
28. JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES AND COMMENTS 552 (Frederic L. Faust
& PaulJ. Brantingham eds., 1974) (describing the "orthodox" view).
29.

Tanenhaus, supra note 19, at 20-21.
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years. Since 1979, most states have dramatically expanded transfer
jurisdiction, both in terms of the age at which it attaches and the types of
crimes that can trigger it. As a result, transfers of juveniles have increased by
at least seventy percent. 0 Further, the number of states that permit
automatic transfer (rather than leaving that decision to the discretion of the
juvenile court) has more than doubled to thirty-one, and thirteen states have
lowered the age at which juvenile-court jurisdiction ends to fifteen or
sixteen. 31 For those juveniles who remain in juvenile court, roughly half of
the states have adopted some version of "blended" sentencing, which
permits imposition of adult sentences on juveniles, albeit with the option of
32
suspending a portion of the sentence under certain circumstances.
There appear to be two dominant reasons why the adult-retribution
model has been so attractive during the last three decades. First, reformers
believed that juvenile crime was increasing significantly (a perception that
turned out to be inaccurate for most of that time period). 33 Second,
advocates for a more punitive model assume that juvenile offenders are, in
the words of one prosecutor, "criminals who happen to be young, not
children who happen to be criminal."3 4 On this view, juveniles who commit
adult crimes should pay the same price adult offenders pay, at least when the
crimes are serious.
Not all who believed youth should be held accountable for their crimes
endorsed this adult-retribution stance, however. In the forefront of this
group were the drafters of the American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice
Standards, which were promulgated in 1980. Consistent with a retributive,
just-deserts stance, the Standards recommended that juvenile-court
dispositions be based on the offense, not the offender, and, for the same
reason, they also rejected status offenses. Specifically, the Standards
provided that "[s] anctions should be proportionate to the seriousness of the
offense [and] fixed or determinate," and that "noncriminal misbehavior
(status offenses or conduct that would not be a crime if committed by an

30. Richard E. Redding, Adult Punishment for Juvenile Offenders: Does It Reduce Crime?
[hereinafter Redding, Adult Punishment], in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE
375, 377 (Nancy E. Dowd, Dorothy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK].

Richard E. Redding & Barbara Mrozoksi, Adjudicatory and DispositionalDecision Making
31.
in Juvenile Justice, inJUVENILE DELINQUENCY: PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 232,
238 (Kirk Heilbrun, Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein & Richard E. Redding eds., 2005).
32.
Richard E. Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in AmericanJuvenile Courts, in
CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 19, at 145, 145-79.
33.
Elisabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 807-09
(2003).
34. Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away with Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System Needs an
Overhaul, 34 POL'Y REV. 65, 66 (2000).
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adult) should be removed from juvenile-court jurisdiction. '3 5 But the
drafters of the Standards also believed that juveniles' relative immaturity
required lesser punishment than that meted out to adults who committed
the same crimes. Thus, according to the Standards, crimes requiring a
twenty-year sentence in adult court might only necessitate a three-year
36
sentence in juvenile court.

More recent writers, supported by empirical findings that adolescents
are more impulsive, less future-oriented, and more subject to peer influence
than adults, have made an even more nuanced case for maintaining a
separate juvenile system grounded on the assumption that youth who
commit crime have diminished responsibility.3 7 The standard conclusion of
this view is that most youth who commit crimes before age eighteen should
be tried and sentenced in juvenile court, with transfer limited to only the
most serious, mature offenders. Although in the past two decades the
diminished-retribution model has been less popular among legislatures than
the adult-retribution vision, its influence is apparent in the large number of
states that mete out relatively short determinate sentences for juvenile
offenders who are not transferred to adult court. 38
Throughout these developments, the individual-prevention model and
the goal of recidivism reduction played a secondary, albeit influential, role.
Judge Mack illustrated the subtle manner in which the parens patriae position
approached the issue when he famously stated:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or
girl committed a specific wrong but, What is he, how has he
become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in
the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.39

35. ABA, IJA-ABAJUVENILEJUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH xviixix (Robert E. Shepherd,Jr. ed., 1996).
36. JOHN M. JUNKER, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS
§§ 4.2(B) (2), 5.2(A) (2) (a) (1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS].
37. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspectiveon juvenileJustice Reform, 88J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 154-72 (1997) (discussing
developmental influences on juveniles' criminal behavior); Franklin E. Zimring, Penal
Proportionalityfor the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and DiminishedResponsibility, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 267 (Thomas Grisso &
Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter YOUTH ON TRIAL]. The latter chapter updates
arguments from Franklin E. Zimring, Background Paper, in CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME:
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS 27,

38-43 (1978).
38. Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform ProposalsBased
on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 757 ("About one-third of the states now have
determinate or mandatory minimum sentencing laws forjuveniles, usually based on the offense
and prior record.").
39. Mack, supra note 23, at 119-20 (emphasis added).
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The drafters of the Juvenile Justice Standards, although focused on just
deserts, also obliquely recognized that protection of the public is a
legitimate goal of juvenile justice. The Standards do not specifically
40
designate public safety as one of the purposes ofjuvenile-justice sanctions,
but their dispositional provisions do indicate that probation conditions
should take into account "whether the juvenile presents a substantial danger
to others." 41 And the most adult-like juvenile-justice reforms of recent times
"superpredator"
were driven in part by the specter of the soulless adolescent
42
who, unless confined, would routinely harm others.
Thus, as one would expect, every approach to juvenile justice voices the
desire to reduce juvenile crime. But the central focus of these visions is
elsewhere. The rehabilitative model hopes first and foremost to help the
child, as Judge Mack's words indicate. The retributive models are, by
definition, meant to punish for past acts, not prevent future ones, with the
result that any achievement of the latter goal is an incidental effect of
disposition. The individual-prevention vision, in contrast, has no other
objective but to prevent future crime; helping the offender is an incidental
goal, not a primary one, and interventions solely for the sake of exacting
retribution are rejected.
43
Despite the general attractiveness of promoting public safety,
prevention has seldom been explicitly adopted as the principal vision of
juvenile justice by any of those who advocate for a separate juvenile justice
system, for at least two reasons. First, a regime modeled on individual
40. STANDARDS, supra note 36, at § 1.1 ("[T]he purposes of the juvenile delinquency code
should be ...to forbid conduct that unjustifiably and without excuse inflicts or risks substantial
harm to individual or public interests"; prevent conviction for "conduct that is without fault or
culpability;" give fair notice, and "recognize the unique physical, psychological, and social
features of young persons").
41. Id. at 160.
42.

WILLIAMJ. BENNETT,JOHNJ. DIIULIO,JR. &JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT 27 (1996).

The authors state:
America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile 'super-predators'-radically
impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more preteenage boys,
who murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting
gangs, and create serious communal disorders[, and who] do not fear the stigma of
arrest, the pains of imprisonment, or the pangs of conscience.
Id.
43. Most state statutes explicitly recognize public safety as a goal of juvenile justice. See,
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-501 (2004) ("[T]he primary purpose of this act is to provide a
e.g.,
continuum of programs which emphasize the juvenile offender's accountability for his actions
while assisting him in the development of skills necessary to function effectively and positively in
the community in a manner consistent with public safety."); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227(1)-(4)
(2001) (stating that the purpose of the juvenile justice system is "[t]o divert. . . , consistent with
the protection of the public safety, those children who can be cared for or treated through
alternative programs" and "[t]o protect the community against those acts of its citizens, both
juveniles and adults, which are harmful to others and to reduce the incidence of delinquent
behavior and to hold offenders accountable for their behavior").
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prevention could lead to widespread abuse, both because our ability to assess
risk is subject to error, and because, in theory at least, it contemplates
intervention even against youth who have not committed any offense (even a
status crime) if they are thought to pose enough of a risk. Second, a pure
individual-prevention regime, like a rehabilitative one, does not formally
pronounce that offenders are blameworthy, and thus may undermine the
expressive or character-building function of the law.
Later in this Article, some refinements to the model are suggested that
address these concerns. For present purposes, it should be emphasized that
the substantive scope of an individual-prevention model is likely to be
significantly different than the other three models. Compared to the
retributive models, it is likely to be both broader in some respects and
narrower in others. Pre-teen children who might not justly be subjected to
significant punishment might nonetheless pose a risk and thus be in need of
serious intervention in an individual-prevention regime (although
confinement in a detention facility would be the last resort under the
individual-prevention model, not the primary dispositional vehicle it is in a
retributive scheme). At the same time, many adolescents who commit
serious offenses might be subject to minimal intervention if they pose
minimal risk, despite the harm they have caused or their relatively
significant legal culpability. Furthermore, transfer to adult court would
never occur in a prevention regime, because regardless of how "culpable" a
juvenile offender might be, the juvenile justice system can always handle the
44
risk he or she represents-in confined space if need be.
Compared to the rehabilitative model, the scope of an individualprevention regime would be narrower in a different sense. Although, as
noted above, in theory a preventive regime does not require any triggering
conduct, in fact, the conduct underlying many status offenses and other
"immoral" behavior is seldom strong evidence of risk (which will usually
require some type of crime), 45 and thus intervention will not be as likely in
an individual-prevention model. Nor would the scope of intervention be as
extensive as the rehabilitative model, since programs designed to "reform"
and "educate" may go far beyond what is necessary to reduce crime, as the
experience during the "child-saving" era illustrates.
Three examples should suffice to spell out these differences between
the various approaches: Imagine a fifteen-year-old who kills his sleeping
father after suffering years of his abuse, a seventeen-year-old gang member
who commits his third car theft and is complicit in a murder, and a nine44. A second reason transfer would not occur in a prevention regime is the empirical
finding that placing juveniles with adults increases recidivism. See infra text accompanying note
98 (reviewing research concerning the effects ofjuvenile incarceration on recidivism).
45. In any event, the legality principle counsels that conduct that does not amount to
crime cannot be the basis for coercive state action. See infra text accompanying notes 195-96
(discussing the principle of legality).
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year-old who routinely tortures cats. A retributive regime-either adult or
diminished-would probably assign significant punishment to the first two
individuals, including incarceration (and perhaps even transfer to adult
court), while at most it would administer a slap on the wrist to the third
youth. In contrast, depending upon the outcome of risk assessment, a
preventive regime might counsel minimal intervention in the first case, a
community disposition aimed at restructuring peer relationships in the
second case, and intensive family and individual counseling in the third
case, assuming cruelty to animals is a crime and strongly indicates risk.
Responses to these cases under a rehabilitative model would probably be
similar to those under the individual-prevention approach, but with two
variations: given the parens patriae premise, intervention under the
rehabilitative model might be more wide-ranging-perhaps involving
something akin to "reform school" in the first two cases-and it would
probably take place in the third case even if cruelty to animals were not a
crime under relevant state law or indicative of significant risk.
The distinctions between the four models can be fleshed out further by
elaborating on the case involving the fifteen-year-old boy who killed his
father. In an adult-retributive regime, the adjudicatory inquiry would
probably take place after transfer to adult court and would focus on the
manner in which the boy carried out the crime. 46 Did he plan the shooting
and enjoy it, did he act impulsively, or did his behavior fit somewhere
between those two poles? This retrospective judgment about the defendant's
past mental state would provide the moral justification for both the
imposition and the duration of punishment. Moreover, the nature of the
disposition would probably be unidimensional-punitive confinement in an
institutional setting-although treatment might be provided during the
incarceration.
From the standpoint of the diminished-retribution model, the boy's age
would be particularly relevant; at fifteen, he is near the age where most
cognitive research draws the dividing line between adolescent immaturity
and adult maturity. As with the adult-retributive model, information about
the manner of the killing would also be relevant. If the boy were judged to
be past the cognitive dividing line on the side of adult maturity or if he
committed the crime in a malicious manner, he might be transferred to the
adult system. If deemed immature, he might remain in the juvenile justice
system, but the primary task of the legal decision maker would still be to fix
blame based on a retrospective judgment about the boy's mental state at the
time of the crime. This assessment of culpability would also be the most
significant factor in determining the duration and location of the

46. SeeJahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1010-11 (Wyo. 1984) (affirming the manslaughter
conviction in adult court of a sixteen-year-old boy for killing his abusive father).
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disposition, although, as with the adult-retribution model, treatment might
be provided during the sentence.
The inquiry under the rehabilitation model would focus on the
psychological well-being of the offender. For instance, experts might address
whether the boy's reaction to his father's abuse has left him so
psychologically traumatized that he is in need of long-term mental health
care in a residential setting. If so, his rehabilitative regime might include
initial stabilization on medication, followed by participation in group
therapy sessions aimed at letting him know that his experiences of abuse are
not unique, and, resources permitting, individual psychotherapy helping
him work through any symptoms of post-traumatic-stress disorder. Once the
state deemed him ready for release from the residential setting, it might
send him to a transitional group home and then, finally, back to his family
and community after therapists had resolved his mental-health problems.
Under an individual-prevention model, as under the rehabilitative
approach, inquiry into mens rea would be minimal, merely assuring that the
killing was not accidental or objectively justified. But in contrast to the
rehabilitative approach and the retributive approaches, under the
individual-prevention model the focus would be whether the boy posed a
risk of further crime and, if so, how to prevent it. Experts would develop an
individual risk-management plan based on an assessment of empirically
identified risk factors at the individual level (does the boy have deficits in
social cognitive skills that limit his ability to resolve conflicts or a substanceabuse problem that facilitates delinquent conduct?), the family level (to
what extent is his mother available and capable of nurturing law-abiding
attitudes?), and the community level (does he associate with delinquent
peers who are likely to condone and encourage future delinquent
conduct?).
As noted above, the state is less likely to confine the boy under the
individual-prevention model than under the retributive models, and transfer
would not be an option. While a rehabilitative approach might start with the
most-restrictive setting and gradually move toward a return home, the
individual-prevention model would rely on the least-restrictive intervention
necessary to reduce risk. Only if evaluation of the boy indicated he posed an
imminent risk of serious harm to others would he be confined, and the state
would periodically review such confinement to determine whether it
remained necessary as a means of reducing risk.
The rest of this Article explores which juvenile-justice path, or
permutation thereof, is optimal, from both an empirical and a normative
perspective. Part III lays out the relevant empirical material. Part IV then
explores its legal implications.

JUVENLEJUSTICE
III. JUVENILE CRIME AND METHODS OF REDUCING IT

The following review of the existing research on juvenile offenders and
programs designed to curb their offending highlights only the most
47
important findings. More elaborate treatment can be found elsewhere.
This Part begins by looking at individual psychological and contextual
factors that might contribute to criminal offending. The research suggests
that the biggest difference between adults and juveniles once they reach
adolescence is their tendency toward reckless behavior. 48 It also suggests that
juvenile crime is as much the result of ecology as it is of intrapsychic
influences. 49 The discussion then briefly examines the implications of these
findings for assessments of risk and ends with a description of some of the
50
more promising programs designed to reduce recidivism.
A.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

Behavioral-science research on delinquent behavior traditionally has
focused on individual psychological factors, especially cognitive functions
that are thought to have some bearing on judgments of juvenile
responsibility. Most of this research suggests that, at a shallow level, cognitive
capacities are operative at a surprisingly early age. Laurence Steinberg and
Elisabeth Cauffman, among the most prominent researchers in this area,
have declared that "[a]bsent some sort of mental illness or retardation ...
anyone who is nine can form criminal intent and appreciate the
wrongfulness of an action." 51 Additionally, by around age ten or eleven,
children have acquired the basic capacity to make "moral judgements [sic]
based on intentions and motives," although this capacity continues to

47. Much of this review is derived from Mark R. Fondacaro & Lauren G. Fasig, Judging
Juvenile Responsibility: A Social Ecological Perspective, in HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 355; see also
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supranote 27, 41-152 (discussing the developmental risk factors for
youth violence, as well as methods of preventing youth violence).
48. See infra Part III.A (discussing psychological factors).
49. See infra Part III.B (discussing contextual factors).
50. See infra Part III.C (discussing the implications of risk assessment).
51.
Laurence Steinberg & Elisabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective on Jurisdictional
Boundary, in CHANGING BORDERS, supranote 19, at 379, 394.
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develop up until the age of about seventeen. 52 By age sixteen, if not before,
53
people have developed adult-like capacity to reason logically.
At the same time, Steinberg and Cauffman found that there are
significant differences between young adolescents and adults in terms of
"psychosocial maturity." They evaluated the latter construct by measuring
three broad categories of functioning: responsibility (the capacity to make a
decision in an independent, self-reliant fashion), perspective (the capacity to
place a decision within a broader temporal and interpersonal context), and
temperance (the capacity to exercise self-restraint and to control one's
impulses).54 Their studies indicate that, compared to adults, adolescents as a
group score significantly lower on measures of self-reliance, consideration of
future consequences, and self-restraint. 55
Other research confirms these three tendencies in ways that are
relevant to juveniles' propensity to commit crimes. Corroborating the
finding that juveniles are less self-reliant than older individuals are multiple
studies, discussed further below, concluding that adolescents are more likely
than adults to give in to bad peer influence. 56 The finding that adolescents
focus on short-term consequences and rewards coincides with research
indicating that youth are more sensation- and risk-seeking, value impulsivity
and fun more than adults, and are less adept than older individuals at
planning and thinking about the future. 57 The finding that juveniles find it

52. Nuno Ferreira, Putting the Age of Criminal and Tort Liability into Context: A Dialogue
Between Law and Psychology, 16 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 29, 35, 36 (2008); see also LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD EDUCATION: A COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW 283

(1987) (stating that a "conventional" level of morality is reached between ages ten and twenty);
Marie-Anne Suizzo, The Social-Emotional and Cultural Contexts of Cognitive Development: NeoPiagetianPerspectives, 71 CHILD DEv. 846, 846 (2000) (noting that as children develop, they have
a greater ability to "reflect on their emotions, consider others' perspectives, and inhibit or plan
their actions").
53. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents' Judgment and
Culpability, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 37, at 325, 330-31 [hereinafter Cauffman &
Steinberg, ResearchingAdolescents 'Judgnent].
54.

See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:

Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 251-52 (1996)
(describing the three major "attributes most often associated with mature decision making"); see
also Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why
Adolescents Might Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 744-45 (2000)
[hereinafter Cauffman & Steinberg, (Im)maturity] (describing "three categories of psychosocial
factors").
55. Cauffman & Steinberg, ResearchingAdolescents'Judgment, supra note 53, at 331-33.
56. See infta text accompanying notes 74-80 (discussing the influence of peer groups on
adolescent behavior).
57. See Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the Development of
Future Orientationand Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 29 (1991) ("Most results show that
the levels of planning, realization, and cognitive structuring concerning the future increase as

adolescents grow older."); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., EvaluatingAdolescent Decision Making in Legal
Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 231 (1995). Scott et al. note:
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relatively difficult to "manage" themselves is related to empirical work
indicating that adolescents are more likely than adults to act on moods and
fleeting desires than deliberate thought.5 8 Thus, researchers speak of a
"vulnerable 'time gap' during adolescence, during which risk-seeking drives
59
overpower regulatory and modulating mechanisms."
Research exploring neurobiological influences on child and adolescent
development and behavior also supports the conclusion that there are
significant differences between juvenile and adult decision-making. Studies
utilizing recent advances in imaging technology indicate that adolescent
brains are less well-developed than previously believed. In particular, the
frontal lobe, which researchers have associated with the control of
aggression and other impulses as well as with measures of cognitive
functioning such as long-term planning and abstract thinking, undergoes
significant change during adolescence and is the last part of the brain to
develop.60

Other neurobiological evidence indicates that differences in the limbic
system and subcortical regions of the brain between adolescents on the one
hand, and pre-teens and adults on the other, correspond to heightened
novelty-seeking and risk-taking behavior in the former group. 61 Steinberg
Compared to adults, adolescents appear to focus less on protection against losses
than on opportunities for gains in making choices[,] ... seem to discount the
future more [, ... weigh more heavily the short-term consequences of decisions[,]
... [and find it harder] to contemplate the meaning of a consequence that will be
realized 10 to 15 years in the future, because such a time span is not easily made
relevant to adolescent experience.
Id.; see also Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed
by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764,
1774 (2008) (finding that sensation-seeking increases during early adolescence, peaks around
age fourteen or fifteen, and then steadily declines).
58. Pravan Kambam & Christopher Thompson, The Development of Decision-Making
Capacities in Children and Adolescents: Psychological and Neurological Perspectives and Their
Implications for Juvenile Defendants, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 173, 175 (2009) ("[A]dolescents are
particularly susceptible to the potentially deleterious effects of emotions on decision-making.");
Reed Larson, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi & Ronald Graef, Mood Variability and the Psychosocial
Adjustment of Adolescents, 9J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 469, 488 (1980) (finding that adolescents
are subject to more rapid and extreme mood swings than adults).
59. Kambam & Thompson, supra note 58, at 187.
60. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N,JUVENILEJUSTICE CTR., ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT
AND LEGAL CULPABILITY (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/
Adclescence.pdf (discussing discoveries about differences between adolescent and adult
brains). See also Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A
Longitudinal MR[ Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999) (showing the net increase in
"white matter" between ages four and twenty-two to be 12.4%); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo
Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999) (reporting "large group differences" between adults and
adolescents in terms of frontal lobe maturation).
61.
See Monique Ernst et al., Amygdala and Nucleus Accumbens in Responses to Receipt and
Omission of Gains in Adults and Adolescents, 25 NEUROIMAGE 1279, 1289 (2005) (finding an "age-
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suggests that these changes in the limbic system may promote sensationseeking conduct in early and mid-adolescence at precisely the same time the
prefrontal cortex region of the brain, which controls executive functions
such as planning, regulation of emotions and impulses, and evaluations of
risk, is maturing. This "temporal gap between the arousal of the
socioemotional system, which is an early-adolescent development, and the
full maturation of the cognitive control system, which occurs later, creates a
period of heightened vulnerability to risk-taking during middle
' 62
adolescence."
In sum, the research on adolescent psychology does not suggest that
adolescents lack capacity to formulate intent or are seriously compromised
in their ability to recognize the wrongfulness of criminal behavior. But it
does suggest that they are less risk-averse and are less likely to attend to the

63
Of
consequences of their actions, including criminal acts, than are adults.

course, both of these conclusions are generalizations. Some adolescents
reach maturity much earlier than others, while some adults still demonstrate
adolescent levels of risk-taking. 64 The fact remains, as one recent review of
the literature indicated, that "impulsivity is a normative behavior during

related pattern of regional brain activation [that] may explain the propensity for risk-taking and
novelty-seeking behaviors in adolescents"); Adriana Galvan et al., Earlier Development of the
Accumbens Relative to Orbitofrontal Cortex Might Underlie Risk-Taking Behavior in Adolescents, 26 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 6885, 6891 (2006) (suggesting that the adolescent's neural framework is similar
to that which explains addiction, in that the prefrontal cortex is "'hijacked' by an impulsive
subcortical system, which might render it unable to appropriately modulate decisions in the
context of future consequences"); see also Brian Bower, Teen Brains on Trial: The Science of Neural
Development Tangles with the Juvenile Death Penalty, 165 Sci. NEWS 299, 300 (2004), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1200/is_19j165/ai_n6110300/?tag=content;col1
(describing brain research that suggests that, in order to obtain the same "motivational boost"
that adults have to seek rewards, teens need the stimulus from risky behavior). See generally B.J.
Casey, Sarah Getz & Adriana Galvan, The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 62, 70
(2008) (hypothesizing that the difference between adolescents on the one hand and preteens
and adults on the other is an evolutionary response to the need for adolescents to leave the
family and find a mate); Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation ofIncentive Processingand
Cognitive Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGY BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 212 (2009) (correlating age
with control of behavior).
62. Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 459,466 (2009).
63.
See Jennifer L. White et al., Measuring Impulsivity and Examining Its Relationship to
Delinquency, 103 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 192, 202 (1994) (finding a "striking" relationship
between "behavioral impulsivity" and delinquency, as well as a relationship between "cognitive
impulsivity and delinquency, but one which was not independent ofIQ7).
See Cauffman & Steinberg, (Im)maturity, supra note 54, at 757 ("It is important to
64.
remember that responsibility, perspective, and temperance-the three components of maturity
of judgment studied here-are more predictive of antisocial decision-making than
chronological age alone. Indeed, psychosocially mature 13-year-olds demonstrate less antisocial
decision-making than psychosocially immature adults.").
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normal childhood development." 65 Echoing this view, another researcher
has stated that "reckless behavior becomes virtually a normative
66
characteristic of adolescent development."

B.

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Contextual influences can have profound effects on the development
and continuance of delinquent behavior. These influences range from
parents to peers, from schools to the broader community and the media.
Although many of these factors are also associated with adult crime, their
contribution to juvenile crime is both more proximate (as with family and
school influences) and powerful (as with peer influences, and perhaps
media and neighborhood effects as well). The significant impact of these
factors on juveniles suggests that individual decision-making is only a partial
precipitant of criminal behavior. More importantly, it reinforces the notion
that juveniles who experience these factors may be compromised in their
ability to obey the law and that attempts to improve that ability must take
into account contextual factors.
Family factors are among the strongest predictors of risk for delinquent
behavior.67 Poor parental monitoring, including inadequate direct
supervision, greatly increases the risk of delinquency. 68 Studies indicate that
relational factors such as parent-child communication, the extent to which
parents treat their children fairly or abusively, 69 emotional warmth, and
parental involvement all have independent effects on the risk for delinquent
behavior. 70 Parents' personal characteristics (e.g., antisocial behavior,
substance abuse, psychopathology) also are related to increased risk for

65. Charles W. Mathias, Dawn M. Marsh-Richard & Donald M. Dougherty, Behavioral
Measures ofImpulsivity and the Law, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 691, 697 (2008).
66. June Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 344 (1992).

Adolescence:

A

Developmental Perspective,

12

67. Deborah Gorman-Smith et al., A Developmental-Ecological Model of the Relation of Family
Functioningto Patternsof Delinquency, 16J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 169, 170 (2000) ("Family
functioning has consistently been among the strongest predictors of risk for delinquent and

criminal behavior.").
68. Id. at 170-71. See generally Robert D. Laird et al., Parents' Monitoring-Relevant Knowledge
and Adolescents' Delinquent Behavior: Evidence of Correlated Developmental Changes and Reciprocal
Influences, 74 CHILD DEV. 752, 765 (2003) (describing the benefits of proactive parenting).
69.

ROLF LOEBER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CHILD DELINQUENCY: EARLY INTERVENTION

AND PREVENTION 1-14 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/186162.pdf;
Cathy Spatz Widom & Helen W. Wilson, How Victims Become Offenders, in CHILDREN AS VICTIMS,
WITNESSES, AND OFFENDERS: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND THE LAw 255, 256-58 (Bette L.
Bottoms, CynthiaJ. Najdowski & Gail S. Goodman eds., 2009) (describing research showing a
relationship between violence and both physical abuse and nonphysical abuse).
70. Gorman-Smith et al., supra note 67, at 187-88 (noting, however, that even children of
"exceptionally functioning" families might be at slightly higher risk for minor chronic
offending if they are from poorer neighborhoods).
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delinquency, 71 as are higher rates of residential instability and paternal
unemployment. 72 Finally, of course, parents influence their children's
relationships by selecting the schools their children attend, the
neighborhoods in which they live, and the extracurricular and other
73
activities in which their children engage.
Peer influence probably plays an even more important role in
adolescent crime, 74 and indeed may be the strongest risk factor for
delinquent behavior. 75 Adolescence is usually a period in which reliance on
parents regarding issues of identity and acceptance lessens as reliance on the
peer group increases. As a result, adolescents are more likely than adults to
be influenced by others, both in terms of how they evaluate their own
behavior and in the sense of conforming to what peers are doing. 76 Because
a majority of delinquent adolescent behavior occurs in groups, 77 peer
71. Benjamin B. Lahey et al., Psychopathology in the Parents of Children with Conduct Disorder
and Hyperactivity, 27J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 163, 166-67 (1988) ("The
present results strongly support previous findings... that children with [conduct disorders] are
more likely than other clinic-referred children to have both mothers and fathers who qualify for
the diagnosis of [antisocial personality disorder] and to have fathers who abuse substances.").
72. Gerald R. Patterson et al., Predicting Risk for Early Police Arrest, 8 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 351 (1992) (finding that "social disadvantage makes a direct contribution"
to arrest rates); RobertJ. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing
Social-Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. Soc. 774, 781 (1989) (discussing how social
disorganization and family disruption affectjuvenile crime rates).
73. See generally Brenda K. Bryant, The Neighborhood Walk: Sources of Support in Middle
Childhood, 50 MONOGRAPHS Soc'Y RES. CHILD DEV. 1 (1985) (discussing sources of support from
the child's perspective, including his or her external environment).
74. Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preferenceand
Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 625, 632 (2005) (showing the strong influence of peer behavior on juvenile risky
behavior); Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & David P. Farrington, Advancing Knowledge About Co-Offending:
Results from a ProspectiveLongitudinalSurvey of London Males, 82 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360,
393 (1991) (finding that "the incidence of co-offending decreases with age").
75.

J. DAVID HAWKINS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PREDICTORS OF YOUTH VIOLENCE 1, 5

(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojdp/179065.pdf (analyzing peer-related
factors); Thomas J. Dishon et al., Antisocial Boys and Their Friends in Early Adolescence: Relationship
Characteristics,Quality, and InteractionalProcess, 66 CHILD DEV. 139, 139-40 (1995) ("[C]hildren
are attracted to those most like themselves (i.e., social choice), particularly with respect to
aggressive behavior in middle childhood."); Laura V. Scaramella et al., Evaluation of a Social
Contextual Model of Delinquency: A Cross-Study Replication, 73 CHILD DEV. 175, 189 (2002) (showing
a relationship between deviant peer relationships and antisocial behavior in the community, but
not in the home).
76. Jeffrey Fagan, Contexts of Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in YOUTH ON TRIAL,
supra note 37, at 371, 373 (discussing the role of peers in adolescent crime); see Thomas J.
Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 15 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
608, 614-15 (1979) (showing peer conformity between grades three and twelve peaks at grade
nine); Scott et al., supra note 57, at 230 (explaining that "adolescents are believed to have a
greater inclination to respond to peer influence than do adults").
77. Joan McCord & Kevin P. Conway, PatternsofJuvenile Delinquency and Co-Offending, in 10
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: CRIME & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 15, 16 (ElinJ. Waring &

David Weisburd eds., 2002); see Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implicationsof a
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pressure to go along with the group can exert a powerful counterweight to
the societal commands of the criminal law. 78 Peers may also exert more
indirect influences through their impact on the approval-seeking motives of
the at-risk child. 79 Indeed, Terrie Moffitt argues that adolescents prefer to
mimic their antisocial peers because they appear to have attained adult
80
status in many ways.
Schools also provide an important context for adolescent behavior.
Poor academic performance is related to the prevalence, onset, and
seriousness of delinquency. 8 ' Additionally, minimal educational goals and
poor motivation place children at risk for offending.8 2 Other school
characteristics that research has linked to antisocial behavior include poor
student-teacher relations, the prevalence of norms that support antisocial
behavior, poorly defined rules and expectations for conduct, and
83
inadequate rule-enforcement behavior.
All of the foregoing patterns of behavior develop in neighborhood
contexts.8 4 In general, research has consistently linked living in a highpoverty or low-socioeconomic-status neighborhood to delinquency.8 5 Thus,
Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867 (1981) ("The 'well-known secret' is
this: adolescents commit crimes, as they live their lives, in groups.").
78. Berndt, supra note 76, at 615 ("[I]n both studies conformity to peers on antisocial
behavior increased greatly between third and ninth grades, and then declined."); Scaramella et
al., supra note 75, at 189.
79. LOEBER ET AL., supranote 69, at 7-8.
80. See Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-PersistentAntisocial Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 687-88 (1993) (noting that adolescents who
want "to prove their maturity" are likely to emulate "life-course-persistents" (criminal
perpetrators) because the latter's lifestyle resembles adulthood more than childhood).
81.
Devon D. Brewer et al., Preventing Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offending: A
Review of Evaluations and Selected Strategies in Childhood, Adolescence, and the Community, in A
SOURCEBOOK: SERIOUS, VIOLENT, & CHRONICJUVENILE OFFENDERS 61, 64 (James C. Howell et al.

eds., 1995); Margit Wiesner & M. Windle, Assessing Covariates of Adolescent Delinquency, 33J.
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 431, 439-40 (2004).

82.

J. David Hawkins et al., A Review of Predictors of Youth Violence, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT

JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS 106, 127-28 (Rolf Loeber

& David P. Farrington eds., 1998) (noting studies that identify low commitment and attachment
to school and low occupational expectations as predictors of youth violence).
83. Todd I. Herrenkohl et al., School and Community Risk Factors and Interventions, in CHILD
DELINQUENTS: DEVELOPMENT, INTERVENTION, AND SERVICE NEEDS, at 211, 216-21 (Rolf Loeber

& David Farrington eds., 2001) (discussing, inter alia, research showing correlations between
student-teacher relations, and discipline and antisocial behavior). See generally Allison Ann
Payne, A Multilevel Analysis of the Relationships Among Communal School Organization, Student
Bonding, and Delinquency, 45 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 429 (2008) (discussing the relationship
between school organization, peer relationships and antisocial behavior).
84.

See generally URIE

BRONFENBRENNER,

THE ECOLOGY OF

HUMAN

DEVELOPMENT:

EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN (1979) (utilizing an "ecological systems" model as a
framework for examining otherwise inextricable factors present in individuals' developmental
environment).
85. LOEBER ET AL., supra note 69, at 8 (summarizing research concerning poverty and
juvenile crime); Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of
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one study found that impulsive boys in poor neighborhoods were at great
risk for offending.8 6 Yet it is also important to recognize, asJeffrey Fagan has
noted, that "social cohesion among individuals" can mitigate the effect of
poverty.8 7 Weak social controls and lack of community structure allow
delinquent behavior to go on unchecked,8 8 but strong social controls and
parenting counter the risk for delinquent behavior even in the poorest
89
urban neighborhoods.
Exposure to media violence also may contribute to delinquent conduct.
Although theory regarding how this effect occurs and the differences
between its short-term and long-term impact is still developing, scientists
investigating this topic have found clear evidence that exposure to media
violence increases aggressive and violent behavior in juveniles. 90 Further,
highly aggressive individuals show greater effects of exposure to media
violence than less-aggressive individuals. 9 1 Research also has shown that
children's perceptions of the violence as "lifelike" or "real" and their
identification with aggressive characters are positively related to aggressive
92
behavior.
Collective Efficacy, 277 Sc. 919, 923 (1997) (noting that social cohesion and trust correlated
robustly with reduced violence). See generally Carter Hay et al., Compounded Risk: The Implications
for Delinquency of Coming from a Poor Family that Lives in a Poor Community, 36 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE 593 (2007) (showing high correlation between poor neighborhoods, parental
unemployment, and crime); Tama Leventhal & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, The Neighborhoods They
Live In: The Effects of Neighborhood Residence on Child and Adolescent Outcomes, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL.
309 (2000) (reviewing research on how a child's neighborhood affects his or her well-being).
86. Donald R. Lynam et al., The Interaction Between Impulsivity and Neighborhood Context on
Offending: The Effects of Impulsivity Are Stronger in PoorerNeighborhoods, 109 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.
563, 570 (2000).
87.

Fagan, supranote 76, at 371, 375.

88. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND
TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 21 (1993) (finding that "changes that weaken social bonds will
lead to more crime and deviance"); Delbert S. Elliot et al., The Effects of Neighborhood
Disadvantage on Adolescent Development, 33J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 389, 417-18 (1996) (finding
that "aggression rates ...
[are] largely mediated by level and form of neighborhood
organization"); Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, supra note 85, at 319-20 (studying the link between
neighborhood and behavioral patterns); Sampson et al., supra note 85, at 923 (noting that
social cohesion and trust correlate with reduced violence).
89. Gorman-Smith et al., supra note 67, at 192 (stating that children in "exceptionally
functioning" families "are less likely to show any pattern of delinquency and are most protected
from (under-represented in) the most serious [neighborhood] patterns").
90.
Craig A. Anderson et al., The Influence of Media Violence on Youth, 4 PSYcHOL. SCI. PUB.
INT. 81, 81 (2003).
91.
Brad J. Bushman, ModeratingRole of Trait Aggressiveness in the Effects of Violent Media on
Aggression, 69J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 950, 959 (1995).
92.
L. Rowell Huesmann et al., Longitudinal Relations Between Children's Exposure to TV
Violence and Their Aggressive and Violent Behavior in Young Adulthood: 1977-1999, 39
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 201, 215 (2003) ("In this 15-year longitudinal study of 329 youth, we
found that children's TV-violence viewing between ages 6 and 9, children's identification with
aggressive same-sex TV characters, and children's perceptions that TV violence is realistic were
significantly correlated with their adult aggression.").
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Finally, age-based minority social status, with the dependence and
restrictions that this status brings, is correlated with antisocial behavior. This
status differential has two implications. First, adolescent autonomy is more
restricted than that of adults because adolescents have less freedom to
engage in "socially acceptable" outlets for risky behavior, such as legal
gambling, drinking, and risky financial investments. Lacking these legal
outlets, adolescents may engage in unacceptable behavior. Second, minors
are less integrated into the prosocial responsibilities, roles, and relationships
of adulthood. 93 This reduced "stake in life" may lead them to feel they have
less to lose than adults. Specifically, the "informal" costs of sanctionsstigma, the negative effects on employability and marriage, and isolation
94
from mainstream institutions-may be weakened for adolescents.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK AssESSMENT
The type of research described above has made social scientists more
confident in their ability to ascertain which youth are most likely to reoffend. To aid in that effort, they have developed risk-assessment
instruments that assist service providers in determining whether a given
offender poses a low, moderate, or high risk of re-offending. Some of these
instruments provide evaluators with quantified probability estimates, while
others focus more on structuring the inquiry around the most pertinent
individual, family, and community risk factors.
Many of these instruments have undergone fairly rigorous scientific
testing to determine their reliability and validity. For instance, the Early
Assessment Risk List and the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth are
structured risk-assessment instruments that can provide relatively precise
estimations of risk and that purport to be able to distinguish between highrisk youth and those who pose a much lower risk. 95 Other instruments that
can aid in this endeavor are the Youth Level of Service/Case Management
Inventory; the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Youth; and the Risk, Sophistication96
Maturity, and Treatment Amenability Inventory.

93. SAMPSON & LAUB, supra note 88, at 21 (stating that "changes that strengthen social
bonds to society in adulthood will lead to less crime and deviance").
94. Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on GeneralDeterrence:A Critical
Review, 20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 545, 561-66 (1986).
95.
See LEENA AUGIMERI ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT RISK LIST FOR BOYS: EARL-20B, VERSION 2
(2001); RANDY BORUM ET AL., MANUAL FOR THE STRUCTURED ASSESSMENT OF VIOLENCE RISK IN

YOUTH ("SAVRY') 5 (2007) (explaining that the SAVRY assesses adolescents' risk for violence
by analyzing twenty-four items that commonly lead to adult violence).
96.

ROBERT HOGE & DANIEL ANDREWS, THE YOUTH LEVEL OF SERVICE/CASE MANAGEMENT

INVENTORY MANUAL (2006) (analyzing juveniles' risk factors in an effort to determine targets
for treatment among adult offenders); John F. Edens et al., Youth Psychopathy and Criminal
Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis of the Psychopathy Checklist Measures, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 53, 55-56
(2007). See generally Anne-Marie R. Leistico & Randall T. Salekin, Testing the Reliability and
Validity of the Risk, Sophistication-Maturity, and Treatment Amenability Instrument (RST-i): An
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These types of structured protocols improve on the seat-of-the-pants
clinical-prediction process that has often resulted in high false positive rates
(erroneous predictions that a person will reoffend).97 To the extent that a
definitive prediction needs to be made-for instance, as to whether a
juvenile poses the type of risk that warrants confinement or requires
continued confinement-these prediction methodologies can significantly
facilitate it. As the next Section makes clear, however, confinement and the
up-or-down decision it entails should normally not be necessary if the goal is
recidivism reduction.
D.

RFDUCINGDELINQUENT BEHAVIOR

Three preliminary points about interventions designed to reduce
juvenile offending are crucial. First, researchers overwhelmingly find that
imprisonment is less effective at reducing recidivism than most alternative
programs. Lipsey and Cullen's recent comprehensive meta-review of the
empirical studies concluded that incarceration actually tends to increase
recidivism rather than reduce it. 98 Along the same lines, these researchers
concluded that "interventions that embodied 'therapeutic' philosophies,
such as counseling and skills training, were more effective than those based
on strategies of control or coercion-surveillance, deterrence, and
discipline." 99 These findings make sense if offending is in some non-trivial
respect due to context; if so, coercive interventions that take place in
detention are not likely to address root causes of crime or generalize to the
"real world" facing offenders once they are released.

Assessment ToolforJuvenile Offenders, 2 INT'LJ. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 101 (2003), available at
http://www.iafmhs.org/files/Leistico.pdf (studying the reliability of the RST-i in juvenile

males).
97. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE
AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 101-08 (2007)
[hereinafter SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE] (describing prediction methodologies and

their relative advantages).
98. Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A
Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI. 297, 302-06 (2008); see also Donna Bishop
et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does it Make a Difference, 42 CRIME & DELINQ.
171, 183 (1996) (finding "transfer actually aggravated short-term recidivism"); BARRY HOLMAN
& JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 4-6 (2006), available at
http://www.cfij.org/Pdf/116-JP1008-DOD-Report.pdf
(reporting
studies
finding
that

commitment to youth facilities (1) vastly increases the chances of recidivism-more so than
membership in a gang, carrying a weapon, or a poor parental relationship; (2) promotes "peer
deviancy training;" (3) and impedes the aging-out process that normally diminishes criminal
behavior); Redding, Adult Punishment, in HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 375, 389 ("The available
evidence, while not definitive, strongly suggests that transferring juveniles to the criminal court
increases the recidivism rate.").
99. Mark W. Lipsey, The Primary Factors That CharacterizeEffective Interventions with Juvenile
Offenders: A Meta-Analytic Review, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS, 124, 143 (2009).
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A second, equally important finding of meta-review research is that the
treatments most likely to work in terms of reducing recidivism have three
attributes: (1) they are applied primarily to high-risk (i.e., relatively
dangerous) individuals; (2) they target treatment of criminogenic factors
(e.g., antisocial attitudes or peer relationships, criminal role models, lack of
prosocial skill development) rather than vague personal or emotional
problems (e.g., poor self-esteem); and (3) they focus on developing skills
that offenders are capable of applying rather than on adopting
"nondirective" approaches. 100 All three of these attributes suggest that
treatment programs are least likely to be effective at reducing recidivism if
they aim merely at improving the self-concept of the youth or in some other
vague way are designed to "help," as might occur under a pure rehabilitative
model. Intervention is most likely to be successful if its goal is
straightforward reduction of identified precipitants of recidivism among the
most dangerous offenders.
The third preliminary point about intervention strategies is that they
vary widely not only in terms of content, but with respect to scope. Social
scientists divide prevention programs into three types: primary programs
(which attempt to prevent a disorder from occurring), secondary programs
(which attempt to identify and treat a disorder as early as possible to reduce
length and severity), and tertiary programs (which attempt to reduce the
dysfunction created by a disorder that has already occurred).,10 Primary
interventions in the juvenile context seek to change individual and
environmental risk factors through life-skill training, promotion of good
classroom behavior, and improvement of child-parent bonds in all children
and families through school- and community-wide programs. 01 2 Secondary
prevention programs are more selective and are aimed at children who pose
an enhanced risk of delinquency, typically those with high-risk
characteristics and backgrounds but who have not yet engaged in seriously
delinquent behavior. 103 Finally, tertiary programs are targeted at individuals
04
who have engaged in seriously delinquent behavior. 1

100. Don A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 369, 376, 379 (1990). See generally
Mark W. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment: A Meta-Analytic Inquiry into the Variability of Effects,
in META-ANALYSIS FOR EXPLANATION 83 (Thomas D. Cook et al. eds., 1992) (analyzing the
measured effects of various delinquency treatments).
101. See generally William M. Bolman, Toward Realizing the Prevention of Mental Illness, in 1
PROGRESS IN COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH 203, 208 (L. Bellack & H.H. Barten eds., 1969)

("From the standpoint of the community, these distinctions are equivalent to reducing
incidence, prevalence and extent of disability respectively."). These concepts are redefined in
the juvenile context in SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 105-19.
102.

SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 105-06.

103.
104.

Id. atlll.
Id. at 114.
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A further distinction between the rehabilitation model and the
individual-prevention model is that the former model is more likely to call
for juvenile-court involvement if any of these programs could be effective,
whereas the individual-prevention approach will usually only be triggered by
strong risk factors of the type that are dealt with through tertiary
intervention programs. 105 Thus, the rehabilitation model is more likely than
any of the other models to target non-offenders, and, in particular, preadolescents. However, even the tertiary programs that are the focus of
individual prevention could target a (small) number of very young children,
since evidence suggests that some of society's more chronic offenders are
"early starters." These young offenders are most likely to become "life-course
persistent" offenders, whereas those who start offending later in life often
10 6
desist when they reach their twenties.
With these points in mind, consider some of the more prominent
successful tertiary-intervention programs. Functional Family Therapy (FFT)
is one promising intervention strategy for at-risk youth. FF , which targets
youth between ages eleven and eighteen, is rooted in family-systems theory
and principles of behavioral change.1 07 It focuses on altering family-based
risk factors that are associated with delinquent behavior, including parental
maltreatment,
poor parental
supervision,
and inadequate
family
communication, relying on contingency contracts between parent and child
to modify maladaptive and delinquent behavior.' 0 8 When this relatively
short-term intervention program is competently delivered (typically
involving between eight and fifteen sessions), studies indicate that felony
recidivism rates decrease by nearly forty percent, and that a net benefit of
over $10 is realized for every dollar spent on the program, by avoiding the
costs typically associated with crime. 109
Multisystemic Therapy (MST) has also been effective at reducing
recidivism risk and has been particularly successful at decreasing rates of

105. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46 (discussing the two models' different
intervention approaches).
106.

See generally Moffitt, supranote 80, at 676 (contrasting "life-course persistent" offenders

with "adolescent-limited" offenders). "Life-course persistent" offenders are persons that
"engag[e] in antisocial behavior of one sort or another at every stage of life." Id. "Adolescentlimited" offenders are persons with "crime careers of shorter duration." Id.
107. James F. Alexander & Bruce V. Parsons, Short-Term Behavioral Intervention with
Delinquent Families: Impact on Family Process and Recidivism, 81J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 219, 219-25
(1973).

108.

SeeJames F. Alexander et al., Family-Based Interventions with Older, At-Risk Youth: From

Promise to Proof to Practice, 21 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION

185, 193-97

(2000) (describing

components of the program).
109.

WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, OUTCOME EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON STATE'S

RESEARCH-BASED PROGRAMS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 1 (2004),

available at http://www.wsipp.

wa.gov/rptfiles/04-01-1201-ES.pdf. See generally Nancy G. Guerra et al., What Works: Best Practices
with Juvenile Offenders, in TREATING THE JUVENILE OFFENDER 79 (Robert D. Hoge et al. eds.,

2008) (discussing effective juvenile offender treatment programs, including FF17).

JUVENILEJUSTICE
secure detention and out-of-home placement in chronic, violent juvenile
offenders. 110 MST involves a primarily family-based intervention that
changes how juveniles function in various settings associated with antisocial
conduct, including home, school, peer, and neighborhood environments.
Therapists are assigned small caseloads (four to six families) so they can
work intensively with offenders and their families over a relatively short
period of time (approximately four months). The therapist delivers services
in the juvenile's home and other natural settings, such as the offender's
school or neighborhood, to increase the chances that behavioral change will
endure and generalize across settings. 111
A study with a four-year follow-up period demonstrated that recidivism
rates among serious juvenile offenders who completed MST are substantially
lower (22.1%) than the recidivism rates of a comparison group of serious
offenders who completed individual therapy (71.4%). 112 Moreover, a followup study almost fourteen years later revealed that these positive effects were
durable-the MST group had fifty-seven percent fewer arrests in comparison
to the individual therapy group. 113 Recent effectiveness studies have
indicated that the potency of MST may be significantly diluted when
114
therapists do not adhere closely to the prescribed training model.
However, when properly implemented, MST can be both clinically and cost
effective. By minimizing recidivism, reducing costly out-of-home placements
by forty-seven to sixty-four percent, and improving overall family functioning
and the mental health of serious juvenile offenders, MST results in a
"benefit-to-cost ratio of $28.33 for every dollar spent." 115
Unlike MST, where juvenile offenders are treated in their home with
their parents, Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) involves
working with foster parents and biological parents to facilitate the return of
juvenile offenders who have been removed from their family of origin.
MTFC, which involves intensive intervention ranging up to seven months,
110.

ScoTr W. HENGGELER ET AL., MULTISYSTEMIC TREATMENT OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN

CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 237-52 (1998).

111.

Id.

112. Charles M. Borduin et al., Multisystemic Treatment of SeriousJuvenile Offenders: Long-Term
Prevention of Criminalityand Violence, 63J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 569, 573 (1995).
113. Cindy M. Schaeffer & Charles M. Borduin, Long-Term Follow-Up to a Randomized Clinical
Trial of Multisystemic Therapy with Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders, 73 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 445, 448 (2005).

114. Scott W. Henggeler et al., Multisystemic Therapy with Violent and ChronicJuvenile Offenders
and Their Families: The Role of Treatment Fidelity in Successful Dissemination, 65 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 821,829 (1997).
115.
MST Servs., Cost Effectiveness, http://www.mstservices.com/cost

effectiveness.php

(last visited Oct. 22, 2009); see Ctr. for the Study & Prevention of Violence, University of
Colorado-Boulder, Blueprints for Violence Prevention, http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/
blueprints/modelprograms/MST.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) ("[A] recent policy report

concluded that MST was the most cost-effective of a wide range of intervention programs aimed
at serious juvenile offenders.").
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shares many of the same assumptions about the causes and consequences of
human behavior with MST, including the importance of family and peer
influences. 116 A comparison of youngsters assigned to MTFC with a group of
offenders assigned to group homes found that those receiving MTFC were
more likely to return to live with their relatives, were subject to fewer
criminal referrals, and experienced fewer than half the contacts with police
and the courts.

117

A conservative depiction of the research is that intervention strategies
have improved to the point that modern multisystemic approaches aimed at
risk management can reduce the risk of recidivism from between forty and
eighty percent to between twenty and fifty percent. 118 These programs also
represent an estimated net savings to taxpayers of between $7000 and
$18,000 per child in lieu of more traditional placements. 119 Overall, a fair
appraisal of state-of-the-art intervention strategies suggests that ecologically
oriented, cognitive-behavioral interventions aimed at the multiple life
contexts in which juveniles exist (family, peer, school, neighborhood) can
be both clinically and cost effective. As a result, several states make use of
these types of programs in their juvenile justice system, albeit often within a
retributive framework rather than a rehabilitative or prevention-oriented
system. 120

116. Patricia Chamberlain & John B. Reid, Comparison of Two Community Alternatives to
Incarcerationfor ChronicJuvenile Offenders, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 624, 624-25
(1998).
117. Id. at 630.
118. Borduin et al., supra note 112, at 573 (indicating that after four years the recidivism
rate for those who successfully completed MST was 22.1% and for those who dropped out of
MST was 46.6%); OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY, No. 09-27,
REDIRECTION SAVES $36.4 MILLION AND AvoIDS $5.2 MILLION IN RECOMMITMENT AND PRISON
COSTS 2-3 (2009) [hereinafter OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS] (comparing youthful
offenders handled through a community-based, family-centered program to youthful offenders
with similar criminal history handled through alternative, primary residential programs, and
finding that the probability of arrest for the former group was twenty-five percent less for any
violation, forty-six percent less for any felony, and forty-eight percent less for violent felonies);
Schaeffer & Bourduin, supra note 113, at 448 (indicating that over thirteen years the recidivism
rate for those who completed MST was fifty percent, compared to eighty-one percent for those
who did not).

119. HENGGELER ET AL., supra note 110, at 252; MST Servs., Multisystemic Therapy: Clinical
Outcome and Cost Savings, http://www.mstservices.com/outcomesj1a.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2009); see also OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 118, at 3 (finding that a
community-based program saved the state $36.4 million in residential costs and $5.2 million in
recommitment and prison costs).
120. For instance, thirty-one states have MST teams in one or more jurisdictions. See MST
Services, Licensed Teams by Location, http://mstservices.com/licensedteams_by_location.
php (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENCE FORJUVENILEJUSTICE

The empirical information presented in Part III establishes that
juveniles are less capable of mature judgment, impulse control and foresight
than adults, and that community-based interventions designed to reduce
criminal behavior can reduce recidivism more effectively than
imprisonment. One could draw a number of conclusions about the legal
implications of these findings. Using the categorizations introduced earlier,
this Part argues that these empirical facts most directly bolster the
individual-prevention vision of juvenile justice, while they provide only a
modicum of support for the rehabilitation and retribution visions.
Recall that the rehabilitation model of juvenile justice is based on the
assumption that juveniles are innocents who should not be subject to
punishment, but rather should receive treatment for significant emotional
and behavioral problems. The retribution models instead hold that youths
are accountable for their actions and thus should be punished for their
crimes, although under the diminished-retribution model punishment
could be mitigated because juveniles are assumed to be less culpable than
adult offenders to a legally relevant extent. The individual-prevention vision,
in contrast, is focused on prevention of crime. It is premised on the
assumption that juvenile offenders are relatively unaffected by the prospect
of criminal sanctions and thus should not be subject to backward-looking
punishment but rather are best handled through forward-looking
interventions. At the same time, these interventions should be aimed at
reducing (and are usually triggered by) criminal acts and thus are narrower
in scope than those that occur under the rehabilitation model.
This Part will first show why the rehabilitation model is flawed. It will
then do the same for the retribution models, focusing primarily on the
diminished-retribution variant, which has gained considerable support
among policymakers. Finally, it will present the positive case for the
individual-prevention model, from both theoretical and pragmatic
perspectives. The theoretical case for that model relies in part on Kansas v.
Hendricks,121 a much-maligned Supreme Court decision upholding sexualpredator statutes, but one which adopts a rationale for state intervention
that is very useful in justifying a separate juvenile justice system and
suggesting how it might function. The pragmatic case for the individualprevention model is based on a comparison of the retributive and preventive
approaches to antisocial conduct. While both systems can be subject to
abuse, the latter type of regime, with some important modifications, is much
more likely to achieve optimal results without compromising core values.

121.

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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THE OwRBREADTH OF THE REHABILFIATION VISION

As noted in Part II, the original juvenile court was grounded on the twin
tenets that youth who commit crimes are not responsible for them and, in
any event, can benefit immensely from therapeutic state intervention. The
first assumption is incorrect for all but the youngest offenders. The second
assumption cannot, by itself, justify a deprivation of liberty; a system that
relied on treatability alone as the basis for coercive intervention would grant
far too much power to the state and is not sufficiently related to the state's
police-power goals. Although most modern observers of the juvenile justice
system probably agree with these points, it is worth fleshing them out to
provide context for the rest of the discussion.
In adult court, conviction is warranted if an individual commits a
criminal act with the requisite mental state (e.g., purpose, recklessness, or
negligence) and is unable to proffer a justification, such as self defense, or
an excusing condition, such as insanity, that causes a substantial lack of
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's actions. These bare criteria
are doubtlessly met by all but the youngest offenders. It turns out that the
old common-law rule-that courts cannot hold children under seven
responsible for their crimes, that children over fourteen usually should be
held responsible, and that those offenders aged seven through thirteen may
or may not cross that threshold122 -comes close to reflecting the empirically
correct view of children's legally relevant mental capacities. At their
youngest, children either do not intend to harm or, if they do, do not
appreciate its wrongfulness. But, as Part III indicated, while children from
seven through adolescence are not as mature as adults, most of this group
(and certainly its oldest half) can easily form the requisite mens rea (intent)
for a crime and are fully aware that their criminal acts are illegal.
More will be said on this score in the discussion of the diminishedretribution model, which depends upon the allegation thatjuveniles are not
as culpable as adults. For now, the point need merely be made that youth
older than ten are usually legally "responsible" for their actions. This group,
which encompasses almost all youth who commit offenses, possesses the
minimum capacities necessary for criminal liability. If the rehabilitation
vision of juvenile justice is justifiable, it is not because juveniles are
"innocent" of crime, but rather because, despite their culpability, their
greater treatability warrants a separate system for them. Indeed, despite their
youths-as-innocent polemic, those who developed the juvenile court were
probably motivated primarily by their perception that youth are unusually
malleable and vulnerable, and thus are both more treatable and in need of
23
isolation from adults.1

122.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 485--86 (4th ed. 2003).

123.

See generally FRANKLIN

E.

ZIMRING,

AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE

35-38

(2005)

(discussing the "diversionary" and "interventionist" motivations forjuvenile justice); Frederic L.
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Whether children are more "treatable" than adults is not clear. But even
if that assertion is true, alone it cannot legitimize a system that can result in
imprisonment. The rationale of O'Connor v. Donaldson,124 a 1975 Supreme
Court decision, establishes an important, if somewhat vague, constitutional
threshold for state intervention of this sort. In Donaldson, the Court held that
the government may not commit people to a mental hospital merely because
they are mentally ill or because such deprivation might "raise [their] living
standards."1 25 Elsewhere the Court stated: " [ T]here is ... no constitutional
basis for confining [people with mental illness] involuntarily if they are
dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom."' 26 Applied to juveniles,
this language would not permit a deprivation of liberty-even one involving
a "treatment facility" rather than a jail or prison-merely because it can
benefit troubled youth. Instead, this most coercive of state actions may only
occur if juveniles pose a danger to others (in which case the state's police
power is triggered) or are in an unsafe situation (in which case the state's
parenspatriaeauthority is implicated).
Of course, many juveniles who do not pose a risk to others might be
unable to "live safely in freedom," an endlessly manipulable phrase. And
there is no doubt that government owes a special duty to children because of
their vulnerable status. The Supreme Court clearly endorsed this
proposition in Pierce v. Society of Sisters127 when it stated, "The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty.., to recognize and prepare him
28
for additional obligations." 1
However, as numerous cases in both the adult and juvenile civilcommitment context establish, short of seriously self-harming actions such
as suicide or a failure to take care of basic needs, the parens patriaepower
does not justify a deprivation of liberty, if only because such a deprivation is
more likely to hurt than help. 129 Exercise of this power is best carried out
Faust & Paul J. Brantingham, Part ]-Models of Juvenile Justice-Introduction and Overview, in
JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES AND COMMENTS 3 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J.

Brantingham eds., 2d ed. 1979) (explaining the juvenile court's assumption that "children were
infinitely malleable, the best possible subjects for the new social sciences to work wonders
upon").

124. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
125. Id. at 575.
126. Id.
127. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
128. Id. at 535.
129. In Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Supreme Court held that even when
parents are willing to commit their children a neutral factfinder must find, at least, that the
child needs treatment in a hospital. The Court did not specifically decide whether "need for
treatment" is a permissible criterion for commitment. But other courts, in both the adult and
juvenile contexts, have rejected that standard to the extent it permits hospitalization on a bare
diagnosis. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 287 (D. Md. 1979) (requiring danger
to self or others before commitment of juveniles); Matter of Commitment of N.N., 679 A.2d
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through other mechanisms, including the primary-prevention programs
described earlier, dependency courts, compulsory-education laws (the
subject of Pierce), welfare rules, and the like. While the absence of these
alternatives at the turn of the twentieth century may explain why the original
juvenile court eagerly sought the parens patriae authority, their existence
today means the juvenile court can focus on manifesting the state's police
power.
In short, the conceptual flaw in the rehabilitation vision is that it seeks
to obtain treatment for both troublesome youth and youth who are merely
troubled. That mixture of purpose explains much of the history of the
juvenile court, which has bounced back and forth from wide-open
jurisdiction to a focus on adult-type crimes. It is also reflected in the strange
insistence among many commentators that juvenile justice remains a
manifestation of the state's parens patriae authority, when in practice it is
often anything but. We need to stop thinking of the juvenile court as an
appendage of the welfare state and aim it toward the goal of dealing with
juvenile crime.
B.

THE MISPLACED Focus OFTHE RETRIBUTIVE MODELS

The retributive models, in their pure form, avoid this conceptual
conflation. Leaving parens patriae matters to other legal systems, these
models are meant to implement the state's police power by punishing
juveniles who harm others. Treatment ofjuvenile offenders is not necessarily
ignored, but it is not necessary to, and in a sense is a distraction from,
assigning culpability and assuring accountability for one's offenses. This
latter fact ends up being the primary problem with the retributive approach.
Its focus on backward-looking attributions of blame blinds it to the benefits
of a forward-looking prevention approach, while making dangerously
tempting the abolition of the juvenile court.
The latter tendency is most obvious if one subscribes to the adultretributive vision of juvenile justice. Under that model, juveniles who
commit crime are considered no less guilty than adults who commit the
same offense. Thus, they should receive the same punishment. If they do
1174, 1187 (N.J. 1996) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of mental illness, need for
inpatient treatment, and "danger to the minor herself or to others, which may include the

substantial likelihood of significant developmental harm if that treatment is not provided" for
commitment of minors under fourteen); Boggs v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 132 A.D.2d

340, 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) ("It is well-established in this state that a person may be
involuntarily confined for care and treatment, where his or her mental illness manifests itself in
neglect or refusal to care for themselves to such an extent that there is presented 'serious harm'
to their own well-being."); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123 (W. Va. 1974)
(holding that involuntary hospitalization is permitted only "when it can be demonstrated that
an individual has a self-destructive urge and will be violent towards himself, or alternatively that
he is so mentally retarded or mentally ill that by sheer inactivity he will permit himself to die

either of starvation or lack of care").
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not, then the system is not really an adult-retribution system, but some sort
of hybrid (about which more will be said below). Under a pure adultretribution model, a separate juvenile justice system is pointless, except as a
way of keeping young offenders away from older ones.
The diminished-retribution vision is meant to redress that problem.
Pointing to the research on differential maturity and judgment canvassed in
Part III, the proponents of this vision argue that a separate juvenile justice
system is necessary as a means of recognizing the diminished
blameworthiness of juveniles. Championed by the drafters of the Juvenile
Justice Standards, 130 Franklin Zimring, 131 and most recently by Elizabeth
Scott and Laurence Steinberg, 132 this view has even influenced the Supreme
Court. In its decision in Roper v. Simmons, exempting individuals under
eighteen from the death penalty, the Court pointed to psychological and
neurological research suggesting that juveniles are immature and concluded
that, compared to adult offenders, juveniles who offend demonstrate "lesser
culpability."

1 33

The diminished-retribution model does concededly support the
holding in Roper, because execution should be reserved for the worst of the
worst and no youth under eighteen, regardless of how egregious the killing,
fits into that class of individuals.134 But as long as traditional culpability
notions are in place, the diminished-responsibility rationale cannotjustify an
entirely separate juvenile justice system for all crimes and all sentences. Even
juveniles as young as nine or ten can be culpable under today's criminal-law
standards, and most juvenile offenders over thirteen probably do not
deserve any mitigation under those standards. While mid-adolescents are not
as mature as adults, their lack of maturity does not mitigate their culpability
as that concept is typically defined in non-capital cases.
Advocates of the diminished-retribution model often analogize the
immaturity of juveniles to the impairment caused by mental illness. 135 But

130.

See generally STANDARDS, supra note 36 (discussing the diminished blameworthiness of

juveniles and proposing a separate juvenile justice system).
131.
See generally Zimring, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 37, at 271 (arguing that
immaturity should be a mitigating factor forjuvenile offenders).
132. See also Redding, Adult Punishment, supra note 30, at 389 ("Punishment that is
proportional to the offender's culpability should be at the heart of the justice system."). See
generally ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008)
(advocating a separate juvenile justice system based on a diminished culpability rationale).
133. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
134. Id. at 568 ("Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a
narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the
most deserving of execution.'").
135.
See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS 80-

81 (1978) (analogizing the diminished responsibility of adolescents to the "partial
responsibility" of people with mental disability who receive "mitigations of punishment").
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adolescents who are not themselves suffering from mental disability are
rarely as impaired as people with schizophrenia and like disorders, which
involve delusions, hallucinations, and other significant cognitive and
volitional disturbances. Moreover, even people with fairly serious mental
disabilities are convicted when they commit crime, and those who are
convicted usually do not even obtain a reduction in sentence.
Consider, for instance, practice under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which apply in all federal cases and are the model for many state
sentencing systems. Although the Guidelines do permit a downward
departure from the typical sentence upon proof of "significantly reduced
mental capacity" not resulting from "voluntary use of drugs or other
intoxicants," 136 the Sentencing Commission's policy statement also declares
that "mental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a departure is warranted."13 7 As a leading federal case
put it, the mental disability must be "extraordinary" or "atypical" to warrant
a downward departure. 138 Thus, federal courts have rarely granted
departures from the Guidelines for mental disability, and when they have,
the defendant's mental state has come close to meriting a successful insanity
plea. 139 Even when a downward departure for mental disability is granted, it
often amounts to only a few years and seldom approximates the huge
discounts contemplated by diminished-retribution advocates. Recall, for
instance, the Juvenile Justice Standards' recommendation that a juvenile
who committed a crime that would require a twenty-year sentence for an
40
adult be sentenced to only three years. 1
In the states as well, mental illness often turns out to be a very weak
mitigator. One review of common law and modern state practice concludes,
for instance, that mental disability short of insanity rarely results in a

136.
137.

U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2008).
Id. § 5H1.3.

138. United States v. Maldonado-Montalvao, 356 F.3d 65, 74 (lst Cir. 2003).
139. Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental Disabilityand
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM.J. CRIM. L. 431, 447 (1995); see also Ellen Fels Berkman,
Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in CapitalSentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 298
(1989) ("Even though courts and legislatures generally consider mental disorders to be a
mitigating factor, many death row inmates are mentally ill."); Developments in the Law: The Law of
Mental Illness, 121 HARv. L. REv. 1114, 1133 (2008) (stating that courts "have imposed prison
sentences beyond what the Guidelines recommend on some mentally ill offenders they view as
dangerous or in need of treatment instead of supplementing Guidelines sentences as necessary
with civil commitment").
140. See, e.g., United States v. Mata-Vasquez, 111 F. App'x 986, 988 (10th Cir. 2004)
(allowing a "four-level" reduction, based on IQ of fifty-one and other impairments, reducing
sentence by six to twelve months); United States v. Cotto, 793 F. Supp. 64, 65-68 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (allowing a "four-level" reduction, based on low IQ and drug use, that reduced the
sentence from thirty-seven months to twenty-four months).
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sentence reduction. 141Although such a stance may seem unduly harsh, note
that a more lenient position would mean that a significant number of
"ordinary" offenders would be entitled to a sentence reduction, including
offenders suffering from depression, impulse disorders, mild mental
retardation, and perhaps even psychopathy and other types of personality
disorders. 142
Consistent with this reasoning, courts rarely consider immaturity a
mitigating circumstance. Most courts, including every court that has
addressed the issue since Roper, have held that even a sentence of life
without parole is not barred by the level of immaturity associated with an
143
offender below age eighteen, at least when the crime is a serious one.
Additionally, a number of courts have rejected the argument that mandatory
and prosecutorial transfer schemes are unconstitutional because they
deprive youth of the opportunity to prove their immaturity. 144
Perhaps the biggest disappointment for advocates of the diminishedresponsibility model has been the courts' almost uniform rejection of
immaturity arguments based on the research indicating that adolescent
brains are less developed than adult brains. The most recent survey of the
141.
NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES AND
GUIDELINES 404 (2d ed. 2007) ("At common law those with severe mental impairments could
be excused from guilt altogether, but offenders with lesser impairments would usually be
subject to the same punishments as mentally sound offenders" while modern statutes require
that mental illness "'significantly reduced the defendant's culpability for the offense.'")
(quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e)(4) (2007)); see alsoJohn Q. La Fond & Mary L.
Durham, Cognitive Dissonance: Have Insanity Defense and Civil Commitment Reforms Made a
Difference?, 39 VILL. L. REV. 71, 102-03 (1994) (noting that offenders found guilty but mentally
ill often receive longersentences than those found simply guilty).
142.
See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 80-83 (2006) [hereinafter SLOBOGIN, MINDING

JUSTICE] (noting that mitigation based on less-severe mental disorders could potentially
"swallow up the death penalty").
143. See, e.g., State v. Eggers, 160 P.3d 1230, 1247-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (depublished);
State v. Craig, 944 So. 2d 660, 662-64 (La. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 714 (2007)
(upholding defendant's sentence under the state and federal constitutions); Commonwealth v.
Wilson, 911 A.2d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (affirming the denial of Wilson's petition for
relief); State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 163-64 (S.C. 2007) (finding that defendant's sentence
did not violate the U.S. Constitution); State v. Rideout, 933 A.2d 706, 713-20 (Vt.2007)
(upholding juvenile defendant's sentence). See generally Hillary J. Massey, Note, Disposing of
Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 1083
(2006) (describing similar cases). But see In re Nunez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 264 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (holding that a child of fourteen convicted of a non-violent kidnapping cannot be
sentenced to life without parole). As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court was
slated to hear arguments in two cases involving this issue and was expected to hand down its
decision by the end of the 2009-2010 Term. See Graham v. Florida and Sullivan v. Florida, 129
S. Ct.2157 (2009) (granting writs of certiorari).
144. See generally Manduley v. Superior Ct., 41 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2002) (upholding a California
statute that allows prosecutors to charge minors in criminal court rather than juvenile court);
State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1997) (upholding the conviction of a juvenile who was
tried as an adult under Minnesota's automatic-certification statute).
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case law concluded that "contrary to many predictions, adolescent brain
science has had little meaningful impact ... in the courts," even at the

sentencing stage. 145 This judicial nonchalance toward the new neurological
findings, however unexpected amongst juvenile-justice advocates, is perfectly
consistent with the observation made above that intentional conduct that is
not the result of significant mental impairment is generally seen as fully
culpable; as the survey author notes, as far as the courts are concerned,
brain-based arguments are doctrinally "irrelevant," "ha[ve] been foreclosed
by legislatures," or clash with observation and common sense. 146 The courts'
bottom-line sentiment with respect to the argument that immaturity of
judgment should be factored into culpability assessments was captured by
the Connecticut Supreme Court, when it stated that, taken to "its logical
conclusion," the argument would "require this Court to rewrite the entire
Penal Code, crimes and defenses, to necessitate consideration of the age of
young offenders for the ultimate purpose of defining their
culpability .... 147
One can plausibly argue, of course, that despite its likely massive
impact, a more generous mitigation scheme is precisely the dispositional
calculus justice systems should have. Perhaps lesser forms of adult disability
as well as adolescent immaturity should routinely result in sentence
reductions. Further, just as offenders with mental disability can be diverted
post-conviction into a separate system (consisting of mental hospitals or
psychiatric units on prison wards), an advocate of the diminishedresponsibility vision can argue that juveniles should be handled in a system
or in units that keep them separated from adults, at least at the dispositional
stage. In essence, Professors Scott and Steinberg, who have developed the
best defense of the diminished-responsibility position, endorse this view.
They assert that young people who offend are entitled to mitigation not only
because of diminished judgment, but also because they are more vulnerable
to coercive influences and peer influence and because their character is
undeveloped, in a state of flux, and very likely will change as they reach
adulthood. 148 Further, they contend that this mitigation should take place in
a system separate from the adult criminal justice system. 149
There is no dispute that adolescents not only are less capable of
deliberate decision-making, but also are more peer-driven and unformed in
character than adults. But to accord these latter two differences any more
mitigating weight than the first would, again, be a radical departure from
traditional understandings of culpability. Typically, coercion short of duress
145. Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 66, on file with authors).
146. Id. at 25.
147. State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278, 297 (Conn. 2007).
148. ScoTT & STEINBERG, supra note 132, at 131-39.
149. Id.
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is not a defense and seldom leads to a reduction in sentence unless it
involves a serious threat of violence to the offender; 150 even then the
sentence reduction is not particularly significant. 151 Allegations that a
person has a "good" character is not a defense at trial unless the defendant
is claiming that he or she is not the type of person who would commit a
crime; 152 in the typical juvenile case, that element is usually conceded by the
defense. More generalized claims of good character provide mitigation only
at sentencing and, for reasons suggested above, they rarely mitigate
culpability even there, at least at the federal level. 153 The examples of
character mitigation proffered by Professors Scott and Steinberg (for
instance, mitigation based on reputation, restitution, and remorse 154) are
different in kind from the type of mitigation that an immaturity argument
posits.
In any event, acceptance of the proposition that evidence of immaturity
should have the vastly expanded impact on legal accountability rules that
Professors Scott and Steinberg imagine would not provide a reason to try
juveniles separately. 155 Rather, it would merely support a system in which
juvenile offenders are adjudicated in adult court and then shunted into a
different dispositional system. Indeed, that is the approach that Barry Feld, a
prominent advocate for the diminished-responsibility approach, has
candidly admitted probably makes as much sense from that perspective. As
he concedes, "While younger offenders may be less criminally responsible
than more mature violators, they do not differ as inherently or
fundamentally as the legal dichotomy between juvenile and criminal courts
56
suggest."1

150. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.12 (2008) (permitting a reduction in
sentence for "coercion and incomplete duress," but "ordinarily" only when the coercion results
from a physical threat to person or property).
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 264 F.3d 527, 530-31 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing how
151.
the trial court was willing to depart downward on the basis of duress and "extraordinary family
responsibilities" from 135 to 108 months).
152. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (permitting evidence of character only to show that the
person "acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion" and then only under limited
circumstances).
153. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide that "prior good works are not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range,"
and that "lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged
upbringing are not relevant grounds for imposing a sentence outside the applicable guideline
range." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.11-12 (2008).
154. Scorer & STEINBERG, supra note 132, at 118-28.
155. Scott and Steinberg make a second argument for a separate juvenile court based on
research indicating that many youth are not competent to stand trial in adult court. Id. at 14980.
156. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and CriminalJusticeSystems'Responses to Juvenile Violence, 24 CRIME
&JUST. 189, 245 (1998).
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Finally, it is not clear that those who endorse the diminishedresponsibility vision are really willing to adhere to it, even at the
dispositional stage. This last conundrum for the diminished-retribution
model arises because, under an honest application of that approach,
juveniles must serve whatever sentence their blameworthiness indicates they
should receive, regardless of whether treatment or any other phenomenon
(including growing older and more mature) changes the likelihood they will
reoffend. On the one hand, those who insist on this just-deserts regime are
willing to permit results that would be unpalatable to many: premature
release of juveniles who may pose a grave risk and, more commonly,
overlong confinement of those who could be safely released or put on
probationary status. On the other hand, those who are comfortable with
taking into account juvenile offenders' risk potential in fashioning
dispositions are, in effect, abandoning the premise of the diminishedretribution model and are instead moving toward the individual-prevention
vision ofjuvenile justice.
For instance, Professors Scott and Steinberg assert that "punishment
calibration should be based on the seriousness of the offense" and "the
culpability of the offender,"' 57 but they also state that "the case for a
separate mitigation-based justice system for the adjudication and disposition
of juveniles rests not only on proportionality, but also on evidence that such
a system is the best means to minimize the social cost of youth crime." 158
They devote an entire chapter to a description of research suggesting the
worth of community-based programs and the criminogenic effects of
detention, 159 thus appearing to endorse these types of dispositions despite
their potential conflict with culpability principles. While they state that "in
hard cases, fairness should trump social welfare," 16 they are willing to
dispense with proportionality analysis altogether in the case of "severely
antisocial youths" who, while representing only a small portion of juvenile
offenders, 16 1 commit a disproportionate amount of juvenile crime. 162 In
short, the system they are proposing seems to be less a retributive regime
than a preventive one. It is now time to take a closer look at the latter model.
157.

SCOTT & STEINBERG, supranote 132, at 231.

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 181-222.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 249.

162.

MICHAEL SCHUMACHER & GWEN A. KURz, THE 8% SOLUTION: PREVENTING SERIOUS,

REPEATJUVENILE CRIME 5 (1999) (exploring the ramifications of a study finding that 8% of firsttime juvenile offenders commit roughly fifty percent of repeat offenses); see also DAVID P.
FARRINGTON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING CRIME: TOWARD A NEW RESEARCH

STRATEGY 50-51 (1986) (describing research finding that roughly five to eight percent of
chronic offenders commit over fifty percent of juvenile crime); MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL.,
DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 88-89 (1972) (reporting research indicating that roughly five
to six percent of chronic offenders commit over fifty percent ofjuvenile crime).
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THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR INDIVIDUAL PREVENTION-RELATIVE
UNDETERRABILITY

A regime explicitly based on individual prevention is a controversial
concept. Although its focus on the police-power goal of preventing harm to
others avoids the open-endedness of a rehabilitative, parens patriae regime, it
is still associated with images of the "therapeutic state," endless confinement,
and totalitarian abuses. Nonetheless, a well-conceptualized individualprevention model is, in the juvenile context, theoretically more justifiable
and practically more attractive than any of the other models.
The theoretical piece relies in large part on Kansas v. Hendricks.163 In
Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a statute that permitted
preventive detention of sex offenders who are shown to have a "mental
abnormality" that predisposes them to commit acts of sexual violence. The
Court also held that, because the state's objective in establishing such
preventive schemes is not retribution or general deterrence, but
rehabilitation and incapacitation-individual-prevention goals-it is not
engaging in punishment despite the significant deprivation of liberty
involved. 164 While on the surface seemingly far afield from the topic of this
Article, this decision, once dissected, provides a provocative prism through
which to viewjuvenile justice.
Hendricks marked an important shift in the jurisprudence of preventive
detention. For some time, most theorists subscribed to the notion that the
only individuals who may be subjected to long-term intervention for the
purpose of prevention, as opposed to punishment, are those who are
seriously mentally ill (i.e., those suffering from psychotic symptoms). Two
grounds were advanced for this view. First, given their distorted perceptions
of the world, people with serious mental illness are oblivious to the dictates
of the criminal law. When people are literally undeterrable by criminal
sanctions, society may protect itself through preventive action. 165 Second, we
express our respect for the principle of individual autonomy by generally
refusing to confine a person, even one who is dangerous, until he or she has
chosen to commit an antisocial act. But preventive confinement of

163. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). Parts of this analysis are drawn from earlier
work. See Christopher Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model ofJuvenileJustice:The Promise of Kansas v.
Hendricks for Children, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 185, 192-204 (discussing the "rationale for a separate,
prevention-oriented juvenile system that is superior to both the diminished responsibility and
greater malleability explanations").
164. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62.
165. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal
Distinction, with ParticularReference to Sexually Violent PredatorLaws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
69, 85 (1996) ("'[Clivil' deprivation of liberty is permissible only as a gap-filler, to solve
problems the criminal process cannot address.").
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dangerous people who are insane does not denigrate their autonomy,
66
because they are presumed to have none when seriously symptomatic. 1
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected these limitations on
preventive detention. Instead, it put its imprimatur on a system that applies
to a category of people (sex offenders) who are not seriously mentally ill
(they are usually said to have "personality disorders"167), are more
deterrable than the latter group (they usually plan their crimes and try to
avoid apprehension1 68), and are viewed as autonomous (as indicated by the
fact that they are virtually never found insane 169). So long as the individuals
detained under these so-called sexual-predator statutes are "dangerous
beyond their control," their detention on dangerousness grounds is
permissible. 170 Further, in Kansas v. Crane, the Court made clear that the
"dangerous beyond control" language does not require undeterrability or
equate to what insanity doctrine sometimes calls an "irresistible impulse." As
the Court explained in Crane.
[In Hendricks,] we did not give to the phrase "lack of control" a
particularly narrow or technical meaning. And we recognize that in
cases where lack of control is at issue, "inability to control behavior"
will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough
to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling
behavior. And this ... must be sufficient to distinguish the
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal
case. 171

166. Janus, supra note 13, at 211 ("The principle of criminal interstitiality would allow civil
commitment ... only if the individual's mental disorder rendered him or her unamenable to
criminal prosecution.").
167. See AM, PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL 686-87 (4th ed., rev.
2000) (placing the "paraphilias" in Axis II, which describes personality disorders, as compared
to Axis I, which includes, inter alia, the psychoses).

168. See Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 505, 524 (1998). Winick notes:
People diagnosed with pedophilia do not molest children in the presence of police
officers or in other situations presenting a high likelihood of apprehension.
Rather, they act with stealth, deception, and premeditation in an effort to avoid
detection. This is purposeful, planned, and goal-directed conduct, not
spontaneous and uncontrollable action or action that is substantially beyond the
individual's ability to avoid.
Id.
169. Id. at 525 (stating that paraphilias "neither render individuals incompetent to engage
in rational decision making nor make them unable to resist their strong desires to molest
children or otherwise to act out sexually").
170. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
171. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
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Courts that have interpreted this language routinely permit commitment
not only of sex offenders with "serious mental illness," such as psychosis, but
also of those diagnosed with some sort of personality disorder. 172 Thus,
while Hendricks and Crane do limit the state's authority to detain preventively
by requiring that those detained be less deterrable than the "typical
recidivist" in the "ordinary case," they also established that the state may
confine people for what they might do rather than what they have done
even when they are not disordered in the sense required for exculpation.
Hendricks did suggest a few other limitations on this preventive power.
First, the state must attempt rehabilitation of those who are preventively
confined. 173 Second, implicit in this first requirement is the idea that the
state must make good-faith efforts to limit the confinement in any way it can
(including treatment). Third, the state must periodically review the status of
74
individuals so confined and release them if they are no longer dangerous. 1
With these caveats, Hendricks makes clear that, as a constitutional
matter, a system based on individual-prevention goals can exist separately
from the criminal justice system and from a prevention system for people
with serious mental illness. Hendricks makes inadequate control of
behavior-what this Article will call "relative undeterrability"-the principal
determinant of whether a preventive system (i.e., a system based on
dangerousness) is justified in a particular case. The question addressed here
is whether juvenile offenders are suited for such a system.
The answer, in short, is yes. The assumption of relative undeterrability
that is required for the individual-prevention model is a much better fit with
what we know aboutjuvenile offenders than the assumptions associated with
the other models. Under the rehabilitation model juveniles are innocent;
under the adult-retribution model juveniles are as culpable as adults; and
under the diminished-retribution model adolescents have difficulty
appreciating the wrongfulness of their criminal acts or are coerced into
criminal activity to a legally relevant extent. None of these images of
juveniles reflect reality. Much closer to the truth is the assumption
underlying the individual-prevention model: juveniles are less likely than

172.

W. Lawrence Fitch, Sex Offender Commitment in the United States: Legislative and Policy

Concerns, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCl. 489, 494 (2003) (stating that only twelve percent of those
committed are diagnosed with a "serious mental illness," and the rest have personality disorders
like paraphilia and antisocial personality disorder).
173. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69. The court stated:
Where the State has "disavowed any punitive intent"; limited confinement to a
small segment of particularly dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural
safeguards; ... recommended treatment if such is possible, and permitted immediate release
upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerousor mentally impaired,we cannot
say that it acted with punitive intent.
Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id.
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older offenders to be affected by the prospect of punishment or have the
capacity to conform their behavior to the requirements of the law. As
indicated in Part III, compared to older individuals, adolescents are less riskaverse, more prone to give into peer pressure, less likely to have a stake in
life, more present-oriented, less likely to have perspective, and more likely to
rush to judgment. All of these traits tend to produce offenders for whom the
deterrent force of the criminal law is likely to be, literally, an afterthought.
Of course, Hendricks requires individualized determinations of
inadequate control before government intervention may take place, whereas
the prevention regime proposed here governs an entire group of offenders,
many of whom have little difficulty controlling their behavior (or experience
such difficulty due to a completely different etiology than is associated with
committable sex offenders). But juveniles as a whole are much more likely
than adults to feature the relevant attributes. As noted in Part III,
"impulsivity is a normative behavior during normal childhood
development." 175 Professors Scott and Steinberg provide additional
persuasive justifications for a categorical approach: the difficulty of
differentiating between those who are compromised and those who are not,
and the fact that the law routinely treats juveniles as a category in other
contexts. 176 But whereas their category is based on the faulty assumption
that adolescents' responsibility is diminished to a legally significant extent,
this Article relies on a more accurate generalization about juveniles' relative
undeterrability.
Ironically, given the common perception that it represents a triumph
for the diminished-responsibility position, Roper provides less support for
that view than it does for the view that juveniles are less deterrable than the
"ordinary recidivist." In exempting juveniles from the death penalty, Roper
not only relied on its finding that juveniles are less culpable, but also on its
conclusion that "the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable
than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to
deterrence." 177 And while the lesser culpability ofjuveniles is, under current
law, only sufficiently mitigating to avoid the worst punishments (and, as
noted earlier, does not even allow juveniles who commit violent crimes to
evade life-without-parolel 78 ), the lesser deterrability of juveniles is not
offense or sentence specific; indeed, if the Court is right in its suggestion
that even the death penalty does not have "a significant or even measurable

175. See supra Part III.A (discussing the psychological factors that have some bearing on
judgments ofjuvenile responsibility).
176. ScoTr & STEINBERG, supranote 132, at 140-41.
177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,571 (2005).
178. See Massey, supra note 143, at 1089-91 (describing how a significant majority of states
still have life-without-parole sentences forjuveniles).
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deterrent effect on juveniles," 179 juveniles are presumably relatively less
likely to be deterred by any specific criminal punishment.
As the Roper Court noted, deterrability is very closely related to
culpability. If adolescents tend to act impulsively or with little thought, they
can be seen as both less deterrable and less culpable. But to the extent that
culpability and deterrability do intermingle, again it is the latter concept
that best describes the import of what is known about juveniles. Consider the
following example offered by Professor Scott, one that she believes illustrates
a situation involving diminished culpability:
A youth hangs out with his buddies on the street. Someone suggests
holding up a nearby convenience store. The boy has mixed feelings
about the proposal, but cannot think of ways to extricate himselfalthough perhaps a more mature person might develop a strategy.
The possibility that one of his friends has a gun, and the
consequences of that fact, may not occur to him. He goes along
with the plan partly because he fears rejection by his friends-a
consequence that he attaches to a decision not to participate-and
that carries substantial weight in his calculus. Also, the excitement
of the holdup and the possibility of getting some of the money are
attractive. These considerations weigh more heavily in his decision
than the cost of possible apprehension by the police or the longterm costs to his future life of conviction of a serious crime. 180
The boy in this scenario clearly demonstrates, as Professor Scott puts it,
"immaturity of judgment." 181 But the symptoms of this immaturity-the
"mixed feelings," the inability to come up with options, the vulnerability to
peer pressure, and the urge for excitement-most obviously compromise
the boy's capacity or willingness to obey the law, not his capacity to
formulate intent or appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. In this typical
juvenile-crime scenario, the case for diminished deterrability is much
stronger than the case for diminished culpability.
Compared to diminished-retribution theory, the relative-undeterrability
rationale offers two conceptual advantages in making the case for a juvenile
justice system. First, the relative-undeterrability rationale is now officially
recognized doctrine. Before Hendricks, one could have well concluded that,
similar to the law's rejection of the principle underlying the diminishedresponsibility model, any difference between adults and juveniles in terms of
deterrability should have no legal implications. After all,just as the empirical
findings indicate that most teens meet the minimum culpability threshold,
none of the research on deterrability suggests that any but the youngest
179.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Development
Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 37, at 291, 306.
181.
Id.; see also SCOTr & STEINBERG, supra note 132, at 132-33.

180.
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children are so volitionally impaired that they are analogous to those found
insane as a result of irresistible impulses. In other words, juveniles are less
deterrable, not undeterrable. But, in contrast to the judicial and legislative
refusal to broaden significantly the scope of diminished responsibility,
Hendricks, Crane, and the lower court case law construing these cases
legitimize a more expansive type of preventive regime, one that can easily
apply to juveniles.
The second way in which allegiance to an individual-prevention model
can make the case for a separate system of juvenile justice more convincing
is political rather than theoretical. To say that we need such a system
because juveniles do not deserve as much punishment as adults is only
weakly persuasive, because, though it coincides with popular views about
youth, it admits that adjudications of juvenile offenders are to use the same
metric courts apply to adults. The diminished-responsibility model is thus
easily characterized as merely a softer version of adult court, a view that
182
smoothes the path for mechanisms, like transfer and blended sentences,
that treat the large number of juveniles who commit adult-like crimes as
adults. In contrast, to say that we need a separate juvenile system because the
greater impulsivity and heedlessness of youth requires that we focus on
prevention not only resonates with common intuition but also is clearly built
on something other than the (adult) punishment model, and thus more
strongly suggests that juveniles need a different type of intervention
altogether. The latter view also coincides more closely with what the public
wants and expects from the juvenile justice system. As Scott and Steinberg's
own study indicated, "Adult punishment and long incarceration are
approved, for the most part, only as a means to protect the public from
violent young criminals; however, if other more lenient sanctions are
183
effective, they are favored over incarceration."
That the Supreme Court has endorsed a version of the individualprevention model or that this model may be better than competing models
at justifying a separate juvenile justice system rhetorically does not
necessarily mean, of course, that the prevention model is the best approach
to the problem of juvenile offending. In fact, as detailed below, the
preventive approach as it currently operates in the adult setting is seriously
flawed. But an individual-prevention model in the juvenile setting is much
preferable to its primary competitor, the diminished-retribution model.
Once a few adjustments are made, the individual-prevention regime better
promotes and reconciles the most important state and individual interests
182.

Transfer statutes permit trial ofjuvenile offenders as adults, while blended sentences

allow courts to impose adult-type sentences on juveniles who reach majority. Transfer of
juveniles increased seventy percent between 1985 and 2000. Redding, Adult Punishment, supra

note 30, at 377. At least twenty states have blended sentencing laws. Redding & Howell, supra
note 32, at 151.
183. SCOTr& STEINBERG, supra note 132, at 281.
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that come into play when a juvenile has caused or is likely to cause harm to
others.
V. OBJECTIONS TO AND BENEIITS OF THE PREVENTION MODEL
The pure prevention model approved in Hendricks is simple to outline.
The state is authorized to act when an offender poses a significant enough
risk to others to warrant intervention. The intervention (not "punishment,"
since the goal is to prevent acts in the future, not rectify past wrongs) is
individualized and should be no more restrictive of liberty than necessary to
achieve the prevention aim.
Individual-prevention regimes have given rise to six essential
complaints. Such a regime, it is said: (1) relies on suspect risk assessments
and risk-management techniques; (2) is highly prone to abuse by
government officials; (3) tends to dehumanize its subjects; (4) ignores the
universal urge to punish, which undermines norms and creates disrespect
for the law; (5) fails to produce a sufficient deterrent effect; and (6) is costly.
Each of these objections is weighty. Many of them diminish in strength,
however, when one looks at analogous problems with retributive
approaches. More importantly, however persuasive these objections are in
the adult context, in the juvenile setting they lack the same force.
Nonetheless, addressing these objections helps flesh out some crucial legal
limitations that must be in place for the preventive approach to be
consistent with society's moral values and legal principles. Additionally,
evaluating these criticisms helps further clarify the practical benefits of the
individual-prevention model.
A.

EVALUATING RISK

The objection most frequently lodged against any regime based on
prevention is that we are not sufficiently adept at evaluating or managing
risk to justify deprivations of liberty. The common wisdom since the early
1970s, accepted even by courts that enthusiastically endorse risk assessment,
is that predictions are wrong at least as often as they are right. 184 And when
it comes to treatment programs, many still adhere to Robert Martinson's
185
famous conclusion in 1974 that "nothing works."
There are several responses to these concerns, which have been
detailed elsewhere in works examining the legitimacy of preventive

184. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920-23 (1983) (discussing the unreliability of
long-term predictions of future criminal behavior).
185. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT.
22, 48-50 (1974). According to Francis Allen, Martinson's conclusion-that most offender
treatment programs had a negligible impact on recidivism reduction-had "an immediate and
widespread impact." FRANCIS ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOC.AL PURPOSE 57 (1981).
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detention as a general matter. 86 At the outset, it is important to
acknowledge that both prediction science-in particular, actuarial-based
risk-assessment instruments-and intervention modalities-in particular,
community-based treatments-have improved immensely over the past
couple of decades. Many of these developments were discussed in Part III. 187
More importantly, while predictive judgments will admittedly always be
suspect even if these advances continue, opponents of prevention regimes
seldom recognize the possibility that those judgments are no less accurate
than the retrospective assessments necessary to implement the primary
alternative to prevention-waiting until a criminal act has occurred and
punishing it based on its relative culpability. Mens rea concepts-the
primary means of grading responsibility for crime-are notoriously difficult
to define and apply. Legislatures and courts have yet to develop a neutral or
coherent doctrine of blameworthiness that approaches the transparency of
actuarial-based instruments used in risk assessment, nor have they devised a
non-arbitrary hierarchy of punishments. 8 8 These findings mean that the
actual time spent in prison can vary enormously depending on the particular
legislative and judicial agents making the decisions.
Even if agreement can be reached as to the proper "desert" for a given
crime in the abstract, the inscrutability of past mental states means that
judges and juries at best can only guess how blameworthy a person is or
whether a particular punishment is deserved. Culpability determinations
depend on the ability of the fact finder to divine whether a crime was
premeditated or simply intentional, reckless or merely negligent. These
terms are not self-defining, and even the defendant him- or herself may not
be able to describe the precise thoughts and beliefs that preceded the
crime. 189 The assumption that one's degree of culpability can be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt is a legal fiction, necessary to obscure the fact
that sentence-differentials measuring in the decades depend on mere
guesses. This jurisprudential sloppiness is exacerbated if one is led to
conclude, based on the research reported in Part III about the extent to
which criminal conduct is attributable to ecological factors, that the law's

186.
Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 130-57
(2005); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudenceof Dangerousness,98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (2003).

187. See supra text accompanying notes 98-120 (discussing different types of intervention
and treatment programs and their effects on recidivism rates).
188. The best effort in this regard to date comes from Paul Robinson, who describes the
high level of agreement among students regarding just deserts in Paul H. Robinson, Intuitionsof
Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007). But he also
notes that there is disagreement about the rank order of even the core crimes, that punishment
using this methodology will depend upon a majority vote, and that the absolute punishment
will still vary substantially depending on the maximum penalty (e.g., the death penalty versus
fifteen years) that one is willing to countenance. Id. at 37-38.
189.
See SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE, supra note 97, at 40-48 (describing the
difficulties associated with ascertaining mental state at the time of the offense).
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method of measuring culpability is skewed by its focus on endogenous
causes.
A third reason that the imprecision associated with risk assessment
should not doom an individual-prevention regime has to do with how we
respond to the inevitable errors that occur. Again comparing the prevention
and retributive approaches, mistakes about risk are, at least in theory, much
easier to correct than mistakes about culpability. As Hendricks held,
preventive interventions must be justified through periodic review at which
the state shows the individual continues to pose the requisite risk. In
contrast, periodic review is inconsistent with the notion of punishing a
person for past conduct.
Finally, the cost of any error that does occur may not be as great in a
preventive regime as it is in a regime focused on retribution. The latter
system demands punishment, which usually involves some type of
confinement (and, when it does not, begins to look much more like a
preventive regime). A preventive system, in contrast, does not require
confinement but can often, as the description of community-basedintervention programs in Part III suggested, achieve its aims through some
less-restrictive means.
Indeed, to be constitutionally legitimate, preventive regimes must
achieve their preventive aim using the least-drastic means available. This
conclusion follows from the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana,
which required that "the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed."190 This language places two limitations on preventive
interventions by the state. First, the nature of the government's intervention
must bear a reasonable relation to the harm contemplated. For instance, as
already noted, most individuals who pose a risk do not require long-term
institutionalization, especially when the harm posed is toward the lessserious end of the spectrum. Second, the duration of the intervention must
be reasonably related to the harm predicted. Discharge is required when the
individual no longer poses a danger, and treatment is required if it will
shorten the duration of confinement. While Hendricks did not address the
first limitation, recall that the Court explicitly adopted the second set of
restrictions in that case. 191
Admittedly, dispositions under the type of sexual-predator statutes
approved in Hendricks, which tend to amount to long-term incarceration in
prison-like settings, do not always follow these dictates. But long-term
detentions are much less likely to occur in the juvenile setting, not only
because community interventions can often be successful with this group,

190. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997). For further discussion of these three
191.
limitations, see SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUsTICE, supra note 142, at 111-15.
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but because the duration of any detention that does occur will be inherently
curtailed by the limitations ofjuvenile-court dispositionaljurisdiction (which
typically ends no later than age twenty-five),192 Note also that, given the
criminogenic effects of confinement with adults and the de-emphasis of
culpability as a basis for intervention, even the most serious juvenile
offenders would never be transferred to adult court in a prevention regime.
Thus, de facto life sentences of the type that may occur under a Hendricks
statute are not possible under a system that is devoted to dealing solely with
young people. Just as importantly, confinement that does occur in such a
regime will bear a direct relationship to its usefulness as a public-safety
measure, as compared to confinement in a retributive regime, which is at
best fortuitously related to public safety and thus can lead to either
premature release or unnecessary restraint.
The conclusion that difficulties in measuring and treating risk do not
preclude preventive interventions does not mean, of course, that such
interventions are permissible upon any showing of risk. There should be
both qualitative and quantitative restrictions on the government's efforts to
prove the requisite level of offender dangerousness and, if intervention
occurs, on how long that intervention may last. For instance, risk assessments
should rely on structured clinical-assessment instruments or actuarial devices
of the type discussed in Part III, and interventions should be proportionate
to risk. The nature of these limitations has been discussed at length
elsewhere.

193

B. ABUSES OFDISCRETION
Even if fears about the uncertainty connected with risk assessment and
management can be allayed, or at least put in perspective through
comparison with the vagaries of culpability assessment and punishment, an
individual-prevention approach remains vulnerable to the criticism that it
expands the opportunities for government officials to misuse their power. In
particular, clarification is necessary with respect to: (1) the type of predicted
harm that authorizes preventive intervention (only crimes, or any behavior
that might be called antisocial?); (2) the type of act, if any, that triggers it
(only serious crime, any antisocial act, or the presence of biological or
environmental "static" risk factors as well?); and (3) the criteria for
192. Typically juvenile court dispositional jurisdiction ends at age twenty-one, although in
some states it extends to age twenty-five. Robert 0. Dawson,JudicialWaiver in Theory and Practice,
in CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 19, at 45, 51. The differential between age and dispositional
jurisdiction also allows prolonged detention of those rare offenders who are at very high risk for
violent offenses. See infra text accompanying notes 204-05 (discussing the indeterminate nature
of preventive schemes).
193. See SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 142, at 141-50 (developing the
proportionality and consistency principles as limits on risk assessment); SLOBOGIN, PROVING
THE UNPROVABLE, supra note 97, at 109-29 (describing evidentiary limitations on prediction
testimony).
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determining when the state must release an individual from its control
(since any offender probably poses some degree of risk, regardless of the
duration or type of intervention).
The first question can be answered relatively easily. Interventions
designed to reduce harm to others should be aimed only at preventing
harms that are defined as such by the substantive criminal law. Allowing
interventions simply to prevent vaguely described or minor antisocial acts
would give government officials carte blanche to round up undesirables who
are only trivially risky and would move too far in the direction of the
discredited status-offense orientation of the rehabilitation model. By
approving preventive detention only for the "particularly dangerous,"
Hendricks may have endorsed this limitation when confinement is sought. 194
We would expand this limitation to all forms of coercive intervention.
The second question, which Hendricks did not address, requires a more
elaborate answer. Although earlier discussion indicated that a tertiaryprevention approach of the type we propose will generally be triggered by a
serious antisocial act, as a theoretical matter a preventive regime does not
require proof of such an act. The logic discussed earlier would permit the
state to protect itself from undeterrable people without having to wait for
any particular conduct.
However, the principle of legality-one of the most venerable principles
of law-imposes a side constraint that requires modification of this aspect of
the preventive approach. The legality principle, which the Supreme Court
has endorsed as a matter of due process, dictates that any law depriving
individuals of liberty or property must give potential violators and
government officials adequate notice of the circumstances under which it
operates. 195 A vague law both chills innocent behavior by citizens and
increases the potential for abuse by officials. 196 Thus, in retributive systems,
inchoate-offense doctrines like attempt try to cabin government power by
demanding evidence that even the most evil-intentioned actor committed
some sort of corroborative conduct before conviction may occur. Similarly,
an individual-prevention regime should require evidence of triggering
conduct as a curb on government power.
There are at least three other reasons, besides limiting official power, to
require an antisocial act as a predicate for preventive intervention. First,
proof of such an act reduces the potential for mistake by providing evidence

194. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69.
195. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[Al statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.").
196. See generally John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189 (1985) (describing the rationales for the legality principle and
suggesting the reduction of constraints on courts' ability to restructure penal law).
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useful to the risk determination. 197 Second, absent proof of an act,
intervention is likely to appear unfair, both to the offender (thus possibly
undermining cooperation with and efficacy of treatment) and to society
(thereby undermining the legitimacy and potency of the system as a whole).
Finally, this requirement would make clear to would-be offenders the precise
point at which the state can intervene, which provides the notice that the
legality principle demands.
Application of the legality principle and these other considerations to a
prevention-oriented juvenile justice system necessitates some sort of
threshold act before intervention may take place. Under the rehabilitative
model, the triggering event could be a so-called "status offense," such as
"incorrigibility," or conduct that would not be a crime if committed by an
adult, such as running away, truancy, or violating a curfew. 198 Under a pure
prevention theory, these types of acts would only authorize intervention if
they were significant risk factors indicative of criminality, which is unlikely to
be the case. 199 But even if the necessary relation between these acts and risk
existed, legality-related concerns about excessive government power should
impose greater limitations in a prevention regime (as they limit
retributivism, which in its pure form would penalize evil thoughts). Low
intervention thresholds might be permissible if juveniles were really treated
like innocents and the interventions were trivial, as is the case in many
primary- or secondary-prevention programs. But when serious restrictions on
freedom are possible, even if part of a community-based program,
interventions should be prohibited unless the state can show that the
individual has committed an act that would be criminal if committed by an
adult.2 0 0

This

position, which

is

also consistent with

the individual-

prevention model's rejection of parens patriae as the basis for intervention by
the juvenile justice system, imposes a significant brake on state power at the
front-end of the preventive intervention process.
Corrupt or discriminatory decisions can also occur at the dispositional
stage, especially during periodic review. Here too there must be restrictions
on the government's efforts to continue intervention. First, the legality
limitation must apply here as well. This means that, at least when they lead
197.
198.

JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 71 (1981).

DEANJ. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL COURTS:
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (1991).

199. For instance, the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth ("SAVRY") is
composed of twenty-four risk factors and six protective factors, none of which focus specifically
on running away, truancy, or curfew violations. See BORUM ET AL., supra note 95, at 19-55
(explaining the evaluation criteria for each factor).
200. Similarly, some acts that are clearly risk factors, such as associating with a gang, should
not, by themselves, authorize tertiary interventions because the adult system would forbid
criminalizing them on constitutional grounds. Cf Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)
(striking down an ordinance criminalizing the failure of a gang member or an associate of a
gang member to disperse after a police order to do so).
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to continued confinement, risk assessments should be based on structured
clinical-assessment instruments or actuarial devices, because they rely on
criteria that are relatively clear and transparent. Additionally, interventions
should be proportionate to the offender's degree of risk, meaning that the
government must demonstrate increasingly stronger proof of risk as the
intervention continues.
Even with these limitations, mistakes and abuse are likely to occur,
which may make a retributive regime, with its determinate sentences and
similar sentences for similar crimes, more attractive to some. But these
desert-based limitations at the back-end are effectively nullified by
discretionary actions at the beginning of the process, where prosecutors are
granted extremely broad discretion that is not subject to judicial or any
other type of monitoring.201 This uncabined authority of the prosecutor can
produce wildly disparate dispositional results. 20 2 Thus, the potential for
abuse is, unfortunately, non-trivial in both types of systems.
Moreover, it is worth questioning whether the goal of equal sentences
for equal offenses, usually seen as a great benefit of the retributive approach,
makes sense. In fact, the desert visited by a particular term of imprisonment
for, say, robbery may vary from robber to robber, depending on the
conditions of imprisonment and the nature of the robber. 20 3 A system that
stresses consistency based on risk is probably more equitable than one based
on culpability, particularly given the malleable nature of the latter concept.
C. DEHUMANIZATION
A third objection to prevention regimes-one which the Court
implicitly rejected in Hendricks but which nonetheless should be given
serious consideration-is that they undermine the autonomy premise upon
which the criminal justice system is built. Whether or not our actions are
determined, the argument goes, it is morally and practically important to
treat people as if they are responsible moral agents.

20 4

Preventive regimes

limited to the incapacitation of those with extreme cognitive or volitional
impairment do not threaten this imperative because they preventively

201. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[Sit long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
202. See ANGELAJ. DAVIS, ARBITRARYJUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 41
(2007) ("[C]ontinuing the same approach to prosecution without consideration of broader

notions of fairness will continue to produce the same results-inequitable treatment of victims
and defendants in the criminal justice system.").

203.
Cf AdamJ. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 182, 186
(2009) (making this argument).
204.

See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSiBILITY 28-53, 180-83 (1968) (explaining

that, for example, if people are not thought to be moral agents, it is unjust and absurd to allow
punishment to turn on whether excusing conditions are present).
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confine only those who have been adjudged legally non-responsible. But
preventive schemes like those endorsed in Hendricks send a different
message. The more categories of people that are confined based on future
rather than past acts, the greater the insult to the moral claim that
individuals control their fate and conduct.
This dehumanization concern is difficult to evaluate because it is so
abstract. It seems most potent when the government creates two systems of
liberty deprivation for those who commit antisocial acts-one designed to
punish and the other designed to preventively detain-and then chooses the
latter option. In this "two-track" situation, exemplified by sexual-predator
systems that co-exist with the criminal process, preventive detention palpably
signals that the person is different, a harmful "predator" rather than a
rational actor who has chosen to commit culpable harm. Research suggests
that this type of stigmatization may even have criminogenic
consequences. 205
The dehumanization objection is less powerful, however, when there is
only one track, entirely devoted to the prevention goal, as under the juvenile
system proposed here. In such a setting, all offenders are evaluated along a
continuum of risk, thereby avoiding the explicit and offensive "dangerous
being" label that characterizes the separate sexual-predator regime.
Moreover, in contrast to the latter regime, intervention based on
dangerousness in a single-track system would, if earlier prescriptions are
followed, occur immediately after proof that the individual caused harm. In
this way, the individual-prevention system resembles punishment based on
desert, even if in fact it is forward-looking in focus.
In any event, the argument that a Hendricks regime would undermine
society's presumption of individual autonomy loses much of its force in the
juvenile setting. As discussed above, while most children can justly be held
legally responsible for their criminal actions, the research suggests that on
the autonomy scale they fall somewhere between adults with severe mental
illness and non-mentally ill adults. More importantly, the perception that
children are less autonomous than adults is widespread. Thus, treatment of
children as relatively non-autonomous does not significantly undercut
society's belief in the concept of "free will" or dilute its ability to condemn
adult offenders.

205. John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent PredatorLaw: A Deliberate Misuse of the
Therapeutic Statefor Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 655, 705-07 (1992) (reprinting

Vernon L. Quinsey, Review of the Washington State Special Commitment Center Program for
Sexually Violent Predators (Feb. 1992) (unpublished manuscript)) (reporting that residents of
sexual predator programs "perceive the law to be arbitrary and excessive," and have more
disciplinary violations than they did in prison because of, inter alia, "[r]esident bitterness
concerning the indeterminate nature of their confinement and its imposition at the end of
their sentence").
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D.

SOCIETAL NEED FORDESERT

Related to the dehumanization objection is the concern that a system
aimed at prevention pays insufficient homage to society's need to express its
repugnance toward offenders, which is said to have a variety of bad
consequences. These critics correctly note that a preventive system would
not always impose the "punishment" demanded by just-desert principles. In
some cases, it could impose a sanction that, when viewed from the desert
perspective, is too lenient, thus allegedly failing to vindicate the interest of
either the victim or society in expressing outrage at the harm done. In other
cases, the intervention may appear disproportionately long from a
retributive perspective. If these instances multiply, the argument goes, there
could be an increase in vigilante justice, a weakening of norms regarding
antisocial behavior, and even a burgeoning belief that individuals are not
responsible for their actions-all developments that might make citizens less
compliant with societal prohibitions. 206
These latter claims are speculative even when applied in the adult
context.20 7 If the preventive approach is limited to the juvenile setting
20 8
the
where, as just noted, the public is not as concerned about desert,
claims seem even less salient, particularly when, as would occur in the type
of regime proposed here, a statement of accountability is made in
connection with adjudication, some intervention takes place after
adjudication, multiple offenses are subject to greater intervention, and the
overall goal of prevention is made clear to the public. With these
characteristics in place, a preventive juvenile system should provide enough

206. See Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 47177 (1997) (discussing how a criminal justice system based on just-desert principles creates
shared norms).
207. Christopher Slobogin, IsJusticeJust Us?: Using Social Science to Inform Substantive Criminal
Law, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 326-27 (1996).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83 (discussing how the public favors more
lenient sanctions for non-violent juvenile offenders); see also BARRY KRISBERG & SUSAN
MARCHIONNA, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, ATTITUDES OF US VOTERS TOWARD
YOUTH CRIME AND THEJUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 5 (2007), available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/

pubs/zogby-feb07.pdf (presenting a poll finding that eighty-nine percent of the respondents
believe that rehabilitation and treatment services can prevent future criminal acts by youth;
sixty-nine percent do not think that incarcerating youth in adult facilities has a deterrent effect
on youth; and eighty-one percent believe crime costs will be less in the future if money is spent

on rehabilitative and treatment services now); SCOTr & STEINBERG, supra note 132, at 279 ("Our
survey suggests that Americans are concerned about youth crime and want to reduce its
incidence but are ready to support effective rehabilitative programs as a means of
accomplishing that end-and indeed favor this response over imposing more punishment
through longer sentences."). As a leading criminological researcher stated, "I have found very

few policy makers unwilling to at least listen to the empirical research when you frame it within
the context of public protection." E.J. Latessa, The Challenge of Change: CorrectionalPrograms and
Evidence-Based Practices, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 547, 549 (2004), available at http://

www.uc.edu/CCJR/Articles/Evidence_BasedPractices.pdf.
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of a bow to desert to avoid the hypothesized harms of ignoring it. Support
for that conclusion comes from the apparent absence of these harms (e.g.,
vigilante justice) in the many jurisdictions that administer or used to
administer preventive-style juvenile justice systems.
It must be admitted, however, that in rare instances a particularly
serious case will cause significant tension in a system based on risk rather
than desert. For instance, the case of Willie Bosket, a fifteen-year-old who
killed two subway passengers in the course of a robbery, occasioned an
uproar in New York when it was handled through the juvenile court system,
which at that time had exclusive jurisdiction over such crimes. 20 9 But the
response to Bosket's disposition also makes clear why a desert-based system
can badly malfunction. Within two weeks of Bosket's sentence, the
legislature rewrote state law to permit transfer of juveniles as young as
thirteen if they committed a serious crime. 210 From a crime-prevention
perspective, the better approach would be to keep someone like Bosket in
the juvenile system, but recognize that such an individual should be subject
to detention as long as he or she poses a high risk of committing serious
crime. That detention could last a number of years (at least up to seven,
depending on the differential between act and dispositional jurisdiction of
the juvenile court), and could even extend beyond the end of typical
juvenile-court jurisdiction if the individual poses a particularly high risk. If
the public is informed that this type of indeterminate confinement is the
likely disposition in many of the most serious cases, it will be less inclined to
demand wholesale counterproductive changes of the type associated with
Bosket's case.
Eventually, a possible reconciliation of desert and risk principles may
come from work attempting to ascertain the extent to which the public is
willing to equate non-incarcerative interventions with prison time in terms of
desert. 211 Conceivably, for instance, six months of MST could have as much
"punitive bite" as a month of prison in the public's mind. This work is still in
its nascent stages, however. And even if desert can be associated with
alternative sanctions, in many cases it will likely require far more
intervention than is necessary in order to complete an effective preventive
program. If so, it makes little sense, at least from a utilitarian perspective, to
extend the intervention simply because some segment of the public will be
bothered by a shorter, less "punitive" disposition, unless and until more solid

209.
See Fox BUTERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE AMERICAN
TRADITION OF VIOLENCE 226-27 (1995) (describing how public outcry over Bosket's case led to
the passage of New York'sJuvenile Offender Act of 1978).

210.
211.

Id.
See Robert Harlow et al., The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical

Scaling Approach for Obtaining Community Perceptions, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 71, 89

(1995) (offering evidence that citizens may find alternative punishments appropriate
depending on the circumstances).
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evidence exists that failing to take these sentiments into account will lead to
212
vigilantism and other types of noncompliance.
E.

DETERRENCE

The first version of the deterrence argument against the individualprevention model is simple: because intervention for prevention purposes is,
by definition, not punishment and, as suggested above, tends to rely on
dispositional vehicles other than confinement, it will fail to deter juveniles
from antisocial behavior. This objection has some merit. Certainly, if there
were no consequences to a criminal act, general deterrence would be
lacking. Furthermore, it is probably the case, as authorities have reported
anecdotally, that the relatively "softer" penalties in the juvenile justice system
reduce young offenders' concern about getting caught. 213 But assuming
some type of coercive intervention will take place after a crime occurs and
that this intervention becomes more onerous for repeat offenders-both
characteristics of an individual-prevention system-a general deterrent
effect similar to that which can be expected from a robust punishment
regime is likely.
This perhaps counterintuitive conclusion derives from the extensive
literature showing that even adult criminals are not affected by legislative
increases or decreases in sentences.2 14 Whether because they are not aware
of sentencing differentials, are governed by (im)moral rather than legal
considerations, do not believe they will be caught, or simply ignore their
best interests due to social, situational, and chemical influences, most
criminals "are undeterred by harsher punishments." 215 If that is true for
most adults, then it is certainly true for juveniles, who are less likely to be
deterred by any type of punishment. In other words, as long as there is some
form of liberty-restricting intervention after an antisocial act, a preventionoriented juvenile justice system will probably generate as much general
deterrence as is possible in most cases. Corroborating this assertion is
research on inner-city youths that suggests that peer behavior and mores
have a much more powerful influence on potential juvenile offenders than

212.

Cf AdamJ. Kolber, How to Improve EmpiricalDesert, BROOK. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010)

(manuscript at 19-21) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457381 (noting that empiricaldesert advocates have yet to demonstrate the value of the compliance induced by empirical
desert relative to the value of other consequentialist goals).
213. Barry Glassner et al., A Note on the Deterrent Effect ofJuvenile vs. Adult Jurisdiction,31 Soc.
PROBS. 219, 220-21 (1983) (recounting interviews with juveniles who said they were less likely to
commit crime after age sixteen, when they could be treated as adults).
214. See generally Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural
Science Investigation,24 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUDS. 173 (2004) (concluding that the manipulation
of criminal-law rules will generally be ineffective at achieving heightened deterrent effects).
215. David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket's
Hanging,4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 297 (2002); Robinson & Darley, supra note 214, at 204.
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does the threat of legal sanctions, 216 as well as research finding that,
2 17
contrary to their statements, youth in adult prison are not deterred by it.
But the deterrence argument can be recharacterized in terms that
overlap to some extent with the dehumanization objection. As Henry Hart
put it, a preventive regime might defeat deterrence in the sense that it
"would undermine the foundation of a free society's effort to build up each
individual's sense of responsibility as a guide and a stimulus to the
constructive development of his capacity for effectual and fruitful
219
decision." 218 Others have echoed this view.
This assertion about the character-building function of punishment is
no more convincing, however. Consistent with our discussion of the
contextual nature of crime in Part III, research shows that families, peers,
churches, schools, and other institutions are the usual mechanisms through
which citizens are taught the difference between right and wrong. As Tom
Tyler states in his summary of this literature, "People are reluctant to
commit criminal acts for which their family and friends would sanction
them[;] individuals look to their social groups for information about
220
appropriate conduct."
216. Wanda D. Foglia, PerceptualDeterrence and the MediatingEffect of Internalized Norms Among
Inner-City Teenagers, 34J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 414, 433, 435 (1997) (finding that the threat of
formal sanctions "means little to young people from economically depressed urban
neighborhoods" and that "the behavior of peers has the strongest association with lawbreaking").
217. Anne L. Schneider & Laurie Ervin, Specic Deterrence, Rational Choice, and Decision
Heuristics: Applications in JuvenileJustice, 71 Soc. SC. Q. 585, 598 (1990) ("The results from this
study show that juvenile offenders in six different cities in the United States did not reduce
their propensity to commit crimes as a function of their perceptions of the certainty or severity
of punishment."). The most substantial study concluding that harsher sanctions do have a
significant effect on juvenile offending is based on finding a twenty-three percent increase in
crime by eighteen-year-olds in states with a relatively harsh juvenile system and a relatively
lenient adult system. Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156,
1175 (1998). Putting aside the unlikelihood that ajuvenile justice system could be appreciably
harsher than an adult system (the author doesn't indicate the criteria used to assign these
categories), the observed increase in crime rate could easily be due to the criminogenic effects
of detention in harsher juvenile regimes, rather than the result of a calculation by eighteenyear-olds that their penalty (in adult court) will be relatively more lenient now that they are
subject to adult jurisdiction. Cf David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The Deterrence Effect of Prison:
Dynamic Theory and Evidence, 34 (Princeton Working Paper No. 550, 2009), available at
http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/550.pdf (finding "small deterrence effects of prison"
on juvenile offenders subject to adult court jurisdiction and suggesting that Levitt's
methodology conflated deterrence and incapacitation effects).
218.
(1958).

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 410

219.
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, A Failure of Moral Conviction?, 117 PuB. INT. 40, 44 (1994)
(suggesting that if a preventive approach were adopted, criminal justice might begin to "lose[]
its ability to claim that offenders deserve the sentences they get[, which might dilute] its ability
to induce personal shame and to instigate social condemnation").
220. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 24 (2d ed. 2006); see also Robert Meier &
Weldon Johnson, Deterrence as Social Control: The Legal and Extralegal Production of Conformity, 42
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Moreover, as one of us has argued in other work, if the goal is to
inculcate sound practical judgment in the individual offender, punishment
through a judicial or jury verdict of "guilty" is a "blunt instrument for doing
SO." 2 2 1 An individualized-prevention regime has a much better chance of
developing good judgment:
[R]isk management, properly conducted, explores the causes of
antisocial behavior and continually stresses the offender's ability to
change that behavior through cognitive restructuring, avoidance of
risky behavior (such as drinking or fraternizing with gang
members), and adjusting relationships. As modern rehabilitative
efforts routinely demonstrate, a regime based on prediction does
not have to insult the notion that past choices have consequences
and that the offender is responsible and held accountable for
them. There is a difference in message, however. The punishment
model says to the offender: "You have done something bad, for
which you must pay." The prevention model says: "You have done
222
something harmful, which you must not let happen again."
Arguably, the latter message is much preferable to the former, especially
when dealing with juveniles, many of whom have been "punished" enough
by their environment.
Perhaps, though, the process of punishment itself builds character.
There is anecdotal evidence supporting the view that doing one's time
instills dignity and allows the released offender to re-enter society with a
guilt-free conscience. 223 Yet there is also anecdotal evidence supporting the
224
view that risk-management programs can instill a greater sense of worth.
Because these latter programs are premised on the idea that time of release
depends upon the offender's willingness to achieve specific treatment goals,
they may enhance individual responsibility and energize those with the

AM. Soc. REV. 292, 302 (1977) (noting that social institutions outweigh criminal law as an
influence on conduct).
221.
SLOBOGIN, MINDINGJUSTICE, supranote 142, at 163.
222. Id. at 156-57.
223.
WILBERT RIDEAU & RON WIKBERC, LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL BEHIND BARS
132-35 (1992); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 194-98 (1980).
224.

BERT USEEM ET AL., INST. FOR Soc. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF N.M., SENTENCING MAI-ERS,

BUT DOES GOOD TIME MATTER MORE? 3 (1996) (noting that corrections officials have stated
that "prisons are safer, more orderly, and more productive when inmates participate in
programs"); Connie Stivers Ireland & JoAnn Prause, Discretionay Parole Release: Length of
Imprisonment, Percent of Sentence Served, and Recidivism, 28 J. CRIME & JUST. 27, 44 (2005)

("[D]iscretionary parole release is the best mechanism by which rehabilitation can be
meaningfully achieved, as mandatory releasees are given an automatic release date and
therefore have no system incentives to seek programs and treatment to facilitate change.").
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potential to be law-abiding. 225 There is insufficient research comparing the
two regimes to do anything but speculate on these points. At least, there is
no clear evidence that retributive punishment is better at "building
character" than a risk-management regime.

F. COST
Even if one accepts prevention as the primary goal of juvenile justice, a
final reason to be reticent about an individual-prevention regime is that all
but the least ambitious versions of it could be enormously expensive. For
instance, the State of Illinois estimated that implementing a sexual-predator
statute in that state would cost more than one-billion dollars over a ten-year
period.226 The key policy question about such expenditures is not whether
they improve public safety; surely they buy some added protection. But
compared to what? The concern is that the amount of money spent on such
programs diverts support from other more effective preventive mechanisms
(to wit, punishment under a retributive model).
That seems unlikely in the juvenile setting. As recounted in Part III,
compared to prison, community-intervention programs for juveniles are not
only better at reducing recidivism but are less costly. 227 The Surgeon
General's Report on Youth Violence echoed these claims, concluding after a
review of the relevant research through 2000 that preventive programs "cost
less over the long run than mandatory sentences and other get-tough
approaches."

228

Even if expenditures are the same on a per capita basis, rehabilitation
ofjuveniles is likely to be more cost-effective than rehabilitation of adults for
at least two reasons. First, if juvenile rehabilitation works, the overall crime
rate will be reduced more significantly because individuals will end their
antisocial conduct earlier. Second, individuals will be crime-free for a longer
period of time, allowing more productive lives on other fronts.
A third, intuitively appealing reason-that children are less set in their
ways than adults and thus easier to rehabilitate-is based on an unproven
empirical assumption. But there is little doubt that adolescents are more
treatable than the average offender committed under the sexual-predator
225.

See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner,

Good Conduct Time: How Much and for Whtom? The

Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 U. FLA. L. REv. 777, 782-96 (2009)
(noting that good-time credits can dramatically increase inmate participation in rehabilitation
programs, provide them incentives to cooperate with prison authorities, and give prisoners
reason to believe they control their fate at least to some extent, thus enhancing their "ability to
operate as independent actors").
226. SeeJohn Q. La Fond, The Costs of Enacting a Sexual PredatorLaw, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 468, 500 (1998) (estimating that implementation of a sexual-predator statute would
increase the prison population, costing $1,007,719,300 over ten years).
227. See supra text accompanying note 115 (explaining that if MST is implemented
properly, the result is a benefit-to-cost ratio of $28.33 for each dollar spent).
228. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 119-21.
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laws authorized by Hendricks,22 9 providing still another distinction between
those laws and the prevention-oriented juvenile justice system proposed
here. If states are willing to spend money on treatment and preventive
intervention, they should make sure to spend a disproportionate amount of
it in the juvenile justice system.
VI. CONCLUSION

The new police-power paradigm contemplated by Hendricks, although
suspect in its application to adults, provides a coherent and defensible
justification for a preventive juvenile justice system. Because children are less
deterrable than adults, they can be subject to preventive intervention.
Because the juvenile court has limited jurisdiction, because children are
perceived as less autonomous than adults, and because the treatment of
youth is relatively cost-effective, a preventive system applied to juveniles does
not have the serious shortcomings associated with its application in the adult
context.
This individual-prevention model of juvenile justice is preferable to the
rehabilitative and retributive models that have dominated discussion of the
juvenile justice system throughout the past century. The rehabilitative model
is based on untenable assumptions about juvenile offenders' innocence and
the scope of government power to socialize youth, and the adult-retribution
model is a recipe for exacerbating juvenile recidivism. The diminishedretribution model, while superior to these two models, rests on assumptions
about juvenile capacities that are inconsistent with current criminal-law
doctrine, and in any event does not provide a persuasive theoretical basis for
a segregated juvenile justice system that takes full advantage of the new
recidivism-reducing community interventions.
In the spirit of compromise, one could nonetheless construct a system
that reconciles all four of these options. The rehabilitative model could
govern disposition of children through age ten or some other preadolescent age. The diminished-retribution model could apply to youth
from that threshold through seventeen or eighteen (or twenty or twenty-five,
depending upon the ultimate correlations between age and immaturity),
with the stipulation that older offenders could be transferred to adult court
if sufficiently mature and their crimes sufficiently serious. Within the range
set by diminished-retribution principles, the ultimate duration of
intervention for those teenagers who remained in the juvenile justice system
could, in line with individual-prevention goals, depend solely on risk
assessment.

229. See generally G.C.N. Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A Meta-Analysis of Recent
Treatment Studies, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSVCHOL. 802 (1995) (showing modest
treatment effects of sex-offender treatment programs).
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This hybrid framework is similar in concept to the system that exists in a
number ofjurisdictions today.230 But the arguments presented in this Article
push against such a hybrid. Very young children should not be the subject of
juvenile-court jurisdiction unless they have committed serious antisocial
conduct and represent a high risk. At the same time, an emphasis on
prevention should lead to the elimination, not just the reduction, of transfer
jurisdiction and "blended" sentencing for older youth. 231 Finally, once
convicted of a (non-accidental, non-justified) offense, juvenile offenders of
all ages should be subject to juvenile-court intervention only if it is consistent
with risk-management principles. They should not receive a sentence even
partially based on retributive notions, because if such sentences achieve
public safety and recidivism-reduction goals, they do so only serendipitously,
while offering too much of a temptation to fold juvenile justice into the
adult criminaljustice system.
The myths surrounding juvenile offenders need to be dispelled. Legal
principles developed for the adult criminal system need to be rethought
when applied to juveniles. Prevention of recidivism, not vaguely defined
"rehabilitation" and not culpability-based punishment, should be the
rallying cry to advocates of a separate regime for more youthful offenders.
The end result will be a more effective, just, and conceptually coherent
juvenile justice system.

230. Daniel Filler & Austin Smith, The New Rehabilitation,91 IOwA L. REv. 951, 954 (2006)
("Across the nation, in every state, local courts are creating newjuvenile tribunals that explicitly
seek to treat and rehabilitate juvenile offenders.").
231. Redding & Howell, supra note 32, at 146.

